Разграничение принципов и правовых норм в философии права Р. Дворкина

Вестник Московского университета. Серия 7: Философия. 2020. № 2. С. 63–71.

Koval S.

This article refers to the English-American analytic philosophical and legal tradition, namely, the philosophy of law of Ronald Myles Dworkin (1931–2013). Dworkin introduces the category of principles as a tool for criticizing legal positivism of Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart (1907–1992) and as the theoretical basis of his legal theory. The article touches the most important distinction between principles and legal rules (hereafter “rules” or “legal rules”), which is very important for the evidential power of Dworkin’s criticism. If there were no differences between principles and rules, the rule of recognition could be a relevant criterion for principles and therefore Dworkin’s criticism would not be consistent. This article analyzes two Dworkin’s articles “The Model of Rules” and “Social Rules and Legal Theory” and the critical article of the legal positivist Joseph Raz “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law”.

Keywords: правовые нормы, принципы, principles, analytical philosophy of law, аналитическая философия права, Рональд Дворкин, legal rules, Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, Джозеф Раз