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The first-person perspective description error in naturalism
In this article it is shown that in some theories defending the non-reductive nature of the first-person perspective a not very consistent attitude to this perspective may be found. Such theories are related by the author to a so-called moderate naturalism. The article shows the difference between moderate and radical naturalism. Radical naturalism completely abandons the idea of subjectivity as unobservable from a third-person perspective. On the contrary, moderate naturalism defends the irreducibility of subjectivity, but believes subjectivity to be a part of the nature. As a case of moderate naturalism, the article considers the approaches of L. Baker and T. Metzinger. Using their approaches to the first-person perspective as an example, it is shown that in case of certain work strategies focused on the first-person perspective, it is possible that a so-called description error may appear, by which a description error of subjectivity – when it is placed in the world on the rights of a part of nature, according to the laws of which it exists – is understood. The logic of this error points to one of L. Wittgenstein's statements about the incorrect placement of the eye in the perspective of the eye view itself. If the first-person perspective is introduced as a point of view (or a point of observation), then its subsequent shift to the observation result area leads to description error. If there is no observation, as well as no viewpoint, we lose the very idea of first-person perspective and actually take the position of radical naturalism.