The article is devoted to a comparison of robotics, аndroid science and some similar traits of modern neo-mythology‘s thinking. We compares the ideas of android (Humanlikeness) and early anthropomorphic myths. Particular attention is paid to the idea of modern man identity in the context of robotics and Android science.
The article identifies the main features of the Russian writer Andrei Platonov’s (1899–1951) comprehension of the anthropological consequences of the radical social transformation during the years of the “Great Turn,” or “Great Break” (i.e., the years of Stalin’s reforms that started in 1929). Platonov’s evaluation is unique in its scale and depth. He was among the first authors to draw attention to the typological commonness of Soviet and German totalitarianisms. Their similarities are not only rooted in the design of the respective regimes. Vice versa, the design itself is generated by the possibilities of inhuman rationalistic activism in mass society. Platonov’s texts written in 1929–1934 were devoted, rather than to mass collectivism or political and socio-cultural reorganization, to anthropology and the possibility of reorganizing man, together with his cosmos. The main idea of these literary works is search for a universal way of human existence in general, including the living and the dead. In these texts, Platonov deeply conceived and felt the complete emptiness and inhumanity of doctrinaire rationalistic activism, when it is accepted as a practical maxim for the universal human will. This body of texts does not represent a dystopian view of a possible future, yet it relates the shock of an encounter with an unexpectedly ambiguous future and the author’s longing and suffering in his attempts to understand it. Such attempts lead to the need for a new anthropodicy as a justification for a human existence, notwithstanding man’s limitations and finiteness. In this respect, the results of Platonov’s reflections are extremely relevant in relation to the analysis of humanitarian factors and the consequences of currently ongoing digitalization of practically all spheres of life, as well as in terms of searching for new foundations of human life under these conditions. Platonov’s works turn out to be more relevant than the alarmism of the philosophers of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and than the contemporary demonization by the conceptions of digital posthumanity and transhumanism. Platonov’s relevance is due to the depth of the topics and problems he raised, and their meaning is just beginning to be revealed today.
Explanation of inversions in Russian history causes major conceptual problems. The traditionally used conceptual apparatus and its theoretical schemes does not seem to really “grasp” this reality, at best, it only describes the Russian reality to some extent. It simply fails to capture the nature and mechanisms that lie in the specifics of Russian society and its dynamics. Hence, there are widespread conclusions about “pathology,” historical “rut,” constant matrix, and endless reproduction of the “predetermined” characteristics of social life in Russia. However, expanding the conceptual apparatus with a constructive approach, combined with a specific historical approach, makes it possible to single out more than one agent of modernization processes (political elite, merged with state authorities), but at least two – authority and society taken discreetly. From this point of view, the inverse nature of Russian modernization has two causes. One of these is social, associated with the peculiarities of Russian society, where underdeveloped social forces are dominated by the imperious will. The second cause is related to modernization attempts based on external historical experience. However, due to the former cause, these attempts turn out to be premature and ill-conceived, giving rise to new conflicts and deformations in society. Both causes are complementary and intertwined. At the same time, there are general civilizational processes, such as urbanization and formation of a mass society, modernization processes in Russian society, including the formation of national identity. This creates prerequisites for a qualitative change in the development of society. If the main factors of inversion “from top down” are hasty and imitative, then doing things “from bottom up” presupposes slow development of the middle class, which, nevertheless, creates conditions for real mediation.
The paper is dedicated to the reconstruction of Alexander Piatigorsky’s observational philosophy within the context of the confrontation between two versions of the transcendental project of man-in-the-world. The first project accentuates the invariant functional organization of cognitive systems by abstracting from bodily, affective and phenomenological realization of this organization. On the contrary, the second project emphasizes the phenomenological perspective of the experience of givenness, always already dependent on whose experience this is and how the cognitive system living this experience is organized. The first project can be called functionalist, and the second – phenomenological. Ontological and epistemological positions of these projects are specified in the problem of the observer, its status in the world and cognitive practice. The observational philosophy possesses an intermediate position between these two programs since, aiming to disclose the invariant structure of observation, it proceeds from the factual experience of the embodied subject placed into the situation of self-observation and observation of the other subject. It is concluded that Piatigorsky’s philosophy borrows from the functionalist project the commitment to self-objectivation (observation of thinking is always the observation of the other thinking) and rejection from the spatiotemporal localization of cognitive activity (thinking is always “none’s” and does not belong to any kind of individual). With the phenomenological project of enactivism Piatigorsky shares the aspiration to disclose the invariant cognitive structures during the empirical observation of the real enactment of cognitive agency (the organization of cognitive systems is the same while its structural realizations are multiple), abandonment of substantialization of the self (“none’s” thinking is considered as the emergent effect of interaction among two or several observers – the autopoietic systems) as well as the refusal from theoretical formulation of the problem of consciousness (observational philosophy develops metatheoretical prolegomena to theory of consciousness, which in turn is considered as lived and essentially practical in phenomenology).
The author reconstructs the theory of F. Varela with relevance to the hard problem of consciousness. This problem was touched by Varela in relatively late period of his work. However, the implications for dissolution of this problem can be found in his earlier works with H. Maturana. Theory of autopoietic systems ties life and cognition together, resulting in natural historical comprehension of consciousness and its functioning. Autopoiesis, understood as network of processes of production of components used as resources for maintaining these processes, sets organizational invariances, distinguishing living system from its milieu. The main criterion of living system is an ability to maintain autopoietic organization while undergoing structural transformations with environment. Structural plasticity leads to multiple realizability of autopoietic organizations, which, in turn, leads to radical conclusion on nature of knowledge. One can distinguish the knower and the known only contingently, for the structure of knowledge reflects cognitive structure of the knower. This intertwinement permits Varela to introduce the enactivist program, which presupposes not simply reform in the scientific research of consciousness but also rethinking the implications of scientific knowledge itself. Cognition is a sensorimotor constitution of the world. Therefore, consciousness is not an object of material nature among other objects but provides our cognitive access to nature. Varela intended to abandon the theoretical approach to the problem of consciousness. His aim was not to provide a new argument. This is a consequence of the enactivist position which, according to theory of autopoiesis, must be applicable to the knower himself.
Article represents the short analysis of conditions of penetration of Jesuits into Russia. In the center of attention is an influence of pedagogical system of Ignatiy Loyola – the founder of Society of Jesus - on formation of consciousness of the Russian aristocracy on the second half of 18-19 centuries and emergence of a phenomenon of the Russian Catholicism.
Starting from the Age of Enlightenment, a person’s ability of self-improvement, or perfectibility, is usually seen as a fundamental human feature. However, this term, introduced into the philosophical vocabulary by J.-J. Rousseau, gradually acquired additional meaning – largely due to the works of N. de Condorcet, T. Malthus and C. Darwin. Owing to perfectibility, human beings are not only able to work on themselves: by improving their abilities, they are also able to change their environment (both social and natural) and create favorable conditions for their existence. It is no coincidence that perfectibility became the key concept of the Idea of Social Progress proposed by French thinkers in the Age of Enlightenment, despite the fact that later it was criticized, above all, by English authors, who justi ed its organic and biological nature and gave a different evolutionary interpretation to this concept, without excluding perfectibility from the philosophical vocabulary. In this article, we address the opposition and mutual counterargu- ments of these two positions. Beyond that, we draw a parallel with some of the ideas of S. Kapitsa, who proved to be not only a critic of Malthusianism but also a direct disciple of Condorcet. In the modern age, the ideas of human self-improvement caused the development of transhumanist movement. Condorcet is more relevant than ever, and today his theory of the progress of the human mind, which in uenced the genesis of modern historical science, needs a rethinking in the newest perspective of improving the mental and physical human nature with the help of modern technologies.
The concept of Dionysianism becomes fundamental in the work of Russian symbolist Vyacheslav Ivanov in the 1900–1910s, which led him to development of an original theory of symbolism. For this poet and thinker, symbolism becomes an integral philosophy of art. Ivanov’s theory of symbolism incorporates aesthetics, ethics, theory of knowledge, philosophy of culture. The concept of Dionysianism formed in the process of Ivanov’s philological studies of Greek religion was marked by the influence of F. Nietzsche. However, under the influence of Russian religious and philosophical thought, Ivanov comes to conclusions that contradicted Nietzsche, concerning both philological and cultural-philosophical aspects of the origin of the tragedy. The present article discusses Ivanov’s perception of F. Nietzsche’s philosophy as well as points of divergence between Nietzsche and Ivanov in understanding the mythologem of Dionysus. Particular attention is paid to the theory of realistic symbolism, understood by Ivanov as a religious symbolism, with its focus on acquiring realia in rebus, which is, at its core, a noumenon. The article also discusses Ivanov’s ideas of convergence of the myth of Dionysus with the Christian religion, his interpretation of the cult of Dionysus as well as Ivanov’s main conclusions regarding the Dionysian cult and Christianity.
China, no matter what they say about its strategy in the US, is not going to challenge the existing world order or fit into it. China, trying to avoid open confrontation with the United States and Western countries, is building its own world parallel to the existing one, a world based not so much on geopolitics as on geo-Economics. At the same time, by its very existence, China proves the possibility of a path different from the West.
The article explores the peculiarities and specific features of phenomenological approach developed in the contemporary analytical philosophy. Despite the fact that the trust in phenomenological approaches continue to grow in analytical philosophy, it is necessary to recognize the presence of noticeable discrepancies between the classical transcendental phenomenology of E. Husserl and contemporary versions of phenomenology in analytical philosophy. The article analyses some of these discrepancies. It is shown that, unlike the skepticism of transcendental phenomenology in relation to scientific methodology in the research of consciousness, the analytical tradition of phenomenology is tuned for cooperative dialogue with science. Explained that phenomenology in analytical philosophy places great hopes on the possibility of making consciousness a subject of joint research work of neuroscientists and phenomenologists. The article claims that in the course of realization of this task, phenomenology in analytical tradition often starts to be interpreted from realistic, and partly from naturalistic positions, that doesn`t meet the project of transcendental phenomenology. As an illustration of this idea, certain approaches of analytical phenomenology are considered, in particular: phenomena are interpreted from the point of view of logical and linguistic analysis, intentionality is connected with the activity of the brain and is located in the natural world, phenomenal consciousness is interpreted as the awareness of a high order, and the phenomena assume a gradual nature and are often identified only with sensual experiences that suggest a correlative correspondence of substrate data of brain physiology. On the basis of this material it is implied some reasons to interpret phenomenological theories which are funded by analytical tradition, as an example of a specific phenomenology of non-transcendental origin.
The paper considers particular provisions of the philosophical and historical concept of George Fedotov; focuses on the analysis of imperial topic in works of George Fedotov, his ideas about the cultural history of the Russia and the essence of imperial project in Russia. The paper states with regard to political and cultural phenomenon of Empire the multiplicity of its interpretation take place in philosopher’s works. This reflects his evolution as a philosopher of history: the focus of his vision shifts from the Medieval Rus to the Empire of Peter the Great, then to the collapsed empire of Nicholas II and, finally USSR - treated by Fedotov as an empire. The concept of Empire evolves into a timeless cultural-philosophical phenomenon from a description of the centralization of power in feudal monarchy of Ivan Terrible in his views. The evolution of philosophical historical views of Fedotov indicated by the changes of his attitude to the historical concept of Klyuchevsky. In the 1940s Fedotov as a deep theoretician considers the empire as a universal idea. The author states the concept of empire proposed by Fedotov gives the understanding of causes the decline of the Russian Empire. The paper (among other) aimed at showing heuristic potential of cultural-philosophical ideas of George Fedotov about the mission of spiritual elite in the process of nation-building. It is shown that Fedotov linked the path to salvation Russia to the study of ancient Russian culture and development of its spiritual heritage.
Introduction to Section War and Peace
The article (written in the genre of “intellectual area studies,” which allows to organically combine careful tracking of a specific human destiny and an accurate understanding of variable cultural and geographical contexts) examines the circumstances of the first visit to Italy in May–June 1904 by Russian artist Leonid Osipovich Pasternak (1862−1945), the father of the poet Boris Leonidovich Pasternak. Unlike the B.L. Pasternak’s “Italian journey” (1912), well known to literary scholars from the poem “Venice” (in two editions: 1913 and 1928) and the “Venetian chapters” of the memoirs Safe Conduct (1931), the details of Leonid Pasternak’s journeys to Italy (1904, 1912, 1923) remain practically unknown to researchers. The author of the article believes that the surviving materials about Leonid Pasternak’s five-day stay in Venice in 1904 make it possible to reconstruct the peculiarities of the self-identification of the artist Leonid Pasternak. The article provides numerous examples of how L.O. Pasternak, a descendant of a Russian-Jewish family from Odessa, in his memoirs and correspondence with his wife, pianist Rosalia Pasternak, emphasizes his “Odessa” identity, which has numerous parallels with the “Venetian” identity. Modern Venice appears to the “Southerner” Leonid Pasternak as an Italian analogue of his native Odessa. The author demonstrated that such self-identification of L.O. Pasternak is explained not only by the fact of his Odessa origin and long residence in a multinational South Russian city but also by the circumstances of his youth studies at the Odessa Art School, whose founders and teachers were, among others, Italian artists and sculptors, who made a great contribution to the cultural history of Odessa.
Encyclopedia article. The article offers a philosophical and sociological analysis of the concept of power. The author starts from an intuitively reliable definition, according to which power is an asymmetric and stable social relation. Characterization of power as a relation dismisses its substantial definition as a quality, ability or force. The substantial definition turns out to be ineffective in the theoretical perspective because power implies correlation of forces and not simply force. The relation between two agents does not fully describes the power relation since one of the parties is usually backed by superior resources. This fact indicates a stable asymmetry inherent in power. However, this asymmetry is not absolute in its nature: power as a social relation persists only if subordinate party has a relative freedom of action. Thus, the time horizon of power is established: the asymmetry of forces during a power struggle turns into asymmetry during the end of this struggle, which forms, in case of preservation and consolidation of second asymmetry, a third asymmetry that is stable power. The spatial horizon of power is formed not by the bodies of agents but by actions, which are expected within the framework of the relationship. These actions in their turn presuppose motivations. As the social differentiation grows and the communication network becomes more complicated, it would be difficult to understand the motivations of the parties. We might treat the concept of power in many alternative ways: either as a necessary component of social life or as disguised coercion; either as a universal or a specific relation; either as a purely individual relation or as a feature of the relations of different communities; either as an effect achieved in spite of resistance or as an opportunity to achieve an effect enhanced by solidarity. The article concludes with a brief overview of contemporary definitions of power, provided by social theory (M. Weber’s classical definition, post-Parsonian concepts of power by R. Dahl, M. Mann, N. Luhmann and S. Lukes) and political philosophy (H. Arendt).