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Об одной эвристической точке зрения, касающейся сходства прямого конституционного и административного судебного нормоконтроля
As a result of the unified essence of regulatory affairs as a logical operation
for comparing the meaning of several normative legal acts, disagreements
have yet to cease about whether it is possible to realize normal and constitutional
direct regulation according to unified rules for administrative legal
proceedings. There is a difference of the subject of legal action within the
framework of the named types of direct regulation that are mainly seen in
the method with the help of which they are realized. These differences define
the main legal-procedural characteristics of direct constitutional regulation,
among which is (1) the need to consider a case by the court in a wide
collegial bench of judges that are equal to each other, (2) the subsidiary
character of constitutional legal proceedings for this category of cases, and
(3) the need to appeal the decision of the court. These create specific characteristics
for legal proceedings for constitutional justice, specifically: the need
to introduce special requirements for candidates for judgeships and guarantees
for the status of judges presiding in constitutional legal proceedings,
and empowering the court apparatus with quasi-judicial functions. These
differences in the subject of legal action prove that there are no dogmatic,
political, or legal grounds for conclusions regarding the principal similarities
between constitutional and general direct regulation and on the possibility
for general jurisdiction courts to perform constitutional regulation.