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Cooperation in the Multi-Agent System with Different Types of Interactions

Ch. 7. P. 60–80.
Aleksandra L. Grinikh

This paper summarizes the list of our works that contain researches about optimality principles for the "n-person prisoner’s dilemma" game. The classic model is considered through the new payoff function for each player that allows to consider it without restrictions for the number of players. The new characteristic function gives an opportunity to introduce the time-consistent subset of the core of the dynamic game. In accordance with this type of game we consider some specific properties of players’ payoffs and construct the new way of their interactions. Using the network representation, the classic model is modified to the wider class of games that allows to specify players’ influence to each other’s payoff function. These investigations can be used for the description of cooperation in the other multi-agent systems.

Language: English
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Keywords: characteristic functioncooperative gamenetwork gamen-person prisoner's dilemma Shapley value

In book

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol. XV
Vol. 15. , St. Petersburg: Saint Petersburg State University, 2022.
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