Can the leniency program deter collusion in young competition jurisdiction of transition economy?

International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies. 2017. Vol. 10. No. 4. P. 383–406.

Yusupova G. F.

The paper fills the gaps between the scale of application of leniency program (LP) almost in every competition jurisdiction in the world and the concentration of the effect assessment on developed countries only. An empirical assessment of LP introduced in Russia in 2007, under imperfect antimonopoly provisions on collusions showed the effects of the changes in the rules of antitrust enforcement on the behaviour of market participants. I test the hypotheses of the impact of LP enforcement on the characteristics of collusion (types of agreement, duration and number of participants). I show that the first version of LP in Russia (2007) made antitrust enforcement less effective and accordingly reduced collusion detection. However, the reform of LP in 2009 provided the positive results. Even in very imperfect institutional environment, the improved version of LP (2009) has impact on collusion participants: less stable collusions are destroyed and potential collusions do not appear.

Keywords: Япония, transition economy, сговор, collusion, ФАС, competition jurisdiction, indicator of collusion sustainability, длительность сговора, Программа освобождения от ответственности, антимонопольное законодательство в России

Publication based on the results of: The Economic Analysis of challenging of the accusational decisions of competition authority (2016)