This paper considers the consequences of public procurement reform in Russia in 2005-2006. We show that before the reform, manufacturing firms with government stakes, old firms and larger firms had advantages in access to government orders. In 2009 large firms retain their advantages in access to government orders. Estimated scales of ‘kickback’ in 2009 were virtually the same in 2005. Active restructuring of the enterprises had no influence on the enterprises’ access to government orders. We discuss the reason for this failure of the radical reform of public procurement in Russia, and provide some policy implications.
The paper fills the gaps between the scale of application of leniency program (LP) almost in every competition jurisdiction in the world and the concentration of the effect assessment on developed countries only. An empirical assessment of LP introduced in Russia in 2007, under imperfect antimonopoly provisions on collusions showed the effects of the changes in the rules of antitrust enforcement on the behaviour of market participants. I test the hypotheses of the impact of LP enforcement on the characteristics of collusion (types of agreement, duration and number of participants). I show that the first version of LP in Russia (2007) made antitrust enforcement less effective and accordingly reduced collusion detection. However, the reform of LP in 2009 provided the positive results. Even in very imperfect institutional environment, the improved version of LP (2009) has impact on collusion participants: less stable collusions are destroyed and potential collusions do not appear.
We analyze the impact of migration on wage, income and the unemployment rate. Using the official Russian statistical database from 1995 to 2010, we calculate a dynamic panel data model with spatial effects. There is a positive spatial effect for wage, income and unemployment rate. There is no significant impact of migration on the unemployment rate. We find a negative relationship between net internal migration and both wages and income, which is explained by the positive effect of emigration and negative effect of immigration for income. However, the migration benefits are not big enough to make a difference on the Gini index across regions. We conclude that migration does not affect the regional σ-convergence of economic indicators.
This paper investigates the determinants of economic growth, while
paying special attention to the role of export and spatial externalities. We hypothesise that not industry variety per se but variety of related industries significantly contributes to economic growth in Russian regions. First, we test for the existence of spatial dependence in economic growth across Russian regions using three traditional indicators of technological progress.
Second, we construct a simple theoretical model where economic growth is exogenously determined and depends primarily on export externalities. The paper shows that export externalities have a positive and significant impact on employment growth in most sectors of the economy. Simultaneously, spatially lagged export productivity has varying effects on employment growth depending on the sector, which is decelerating economic growth in industrial sectors and accelerating economic development in the most advanced service sectors.
In this paper we estimate the effects of indicators of “hard” and “soft” infrastructure on export performance in Russian regions. Empirical results show that both hard and soft infrastructure measures matter for export survival of export flows from non-resource-oriented Russian regions. Empirical estimates account for size and time effects for export flows and find that the positive effects of hard and soft infrastructure are falling over time and are more important for larger exporters. This may serve as an evidence of a learning curve for exporters when the latter become more efficient with time in treating with regional-level hard and soft infrastructure resources
It is known that anticorruption measures do not significantly reduce the corruption of state employees in Russia. The goal of this research is to analyse factors that influence the level of bribery in public procurement. The investigation is based on data from two surveys. The first was conducted by the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics. The second is the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. We use binary response, ordered logit models and probit models with sample selection in this paper. Our econometric study demonstrates that incentives to bribe are higher in sectors with strong competition. Holding company members and the companies owned by the state are less involved in bribery than are private firms. The probability of bribery increases if unpredictable government regulation and political instability heavily influence enterprise performance.
The purpose of this study is to identify the spatial effects of the main macroeconomic indicators of the eastern and western regions of Russia. These regions diffr significantly in population densities and distances between cities. The main research question is the following: How do events in one of the western or eastern regions affect similar indicators in other western and eastern regions? Our analysis revealed: 1) a positive spatial correlation of the main macroeconomic indicators for the western regions, 2) both positive and negative externalities for the eastern regions and 3) a mutual but asymmetric influence of eastern and western regions. Usually "impulses" from the western regions have a positive effect on the eastern regions, but "impulses" from the eastern regions usually do not affect the western regions.
If relative deprivation matters to welfare in poor countries as much as it apparently does in rich ones then one would have to question the priority given to economic growth over redistribution in current development policies. We look for evidence in one of the world's poorest countries, Malawi. Using new survey questions that help address likely biases in past tests, we find that relative deprivation is not the dominant concern for most of our sample, although it is for the comparatively well off, including in urban areas. Our results strengthen the welfarist case for a policy focus on absolute levels of living in poor countries. The pattern of externalities suggests that there will be too much poverty and inequality from the point of view of aggregate efficiency.