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Разработка политики "спасения" финансовых институтов
Financial crisis of 2008 clearly showed weak ability of the banking system to withstand shocks and ineffectiveness of the existing regulation mechanisms and control of financial institutions. The need for efficient public policy preventing liquidity shortages and mass bankruptcy while taking in to account regulator’s transaction costs became obvious. The aim of this study is to construct an implementation mechanism for the salvation policy promoting the reduction in moral hazard from the bank-recipient side; the reduction in regulator’s transaction costs connected with the control of financial institutions; the reduction in the quantity of "unaccounted" but systemically important institutions. We propose ex ante bail-out decision mechanism based on contract theory. The key issue here is to minimize both moral hazard effects and regulator’s monitoring costs. The problem of moral hazard is stimulated by possible government liquidity provision and monitoring of "problem zones". Efficiency is also reduced by the imperfect mechanism of choosing bail-out candidates: key criteria based on gross quantitative indicators and weakly connected with the bank’s performance and network effects.