Self-Covariant Solutions To Cooperative Games With Transferable Utilities

NRU Higher School of Economics , 2014. No. WP BRP 85/EC/2014.

Yanovskaya E. B.

A weakening of covariance property for solutions of cooperative games with transferable utilities - self-covariance - is defined. Self-covariant solutions are positively homogenous and satisfy a "restricted" translation covariance such that feasible shifts are only the solution vectors themselves and their multipliers. A description of all nonempty, efficient, anonymous, self-covariant, and single-valued solution for the class of two-person TU games is given. Among them the solutions admitting consistent extensions in the DavisMaschler sense are found. They are the equal share solution, the standard solution, and the constrained egalitarian solution for superadditive two-person games. Characterizations of consistent extensions (Thomson 1996) of these solutions to the class of all TU games are given.

Keywords: решение, cooperative game with transferable utilities, solution, self-covariance, consistent extensions, constrained egalitarianism, кооперативная игра с трансферабельными полезностями, само-ковариантность, согласованное расширения решений для игр двух лиц