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Роль исполнительной и законодательной ветвей власти в бюджетном процессе постсоветских стран: опыт сравнительного исследования
The budget process serves as a vivid example of the political struggle between political actors, resulting in the redistribution of public resources. It most clearly demonstrates all the features of the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches, which can be considered in a comparative perspective. One of the most interesting areas in terms of research on the interaction of the branches of government can be considered the post-Soviet countries. Here, despite a common institutional legacy, different models of such interaction are presented, which is especially clearly manifested in the organization of the budget process. The article aims to identify the role of the legislative and executive branches of government in the budget process of post-Soviet countries. The methodological basis of the study is I. Venus's Index of Legislative Budget Institutions, modified by the authors to take into account the specifics of post-Soviet states. It includes an assessment of six parameters: the power of parliament to amend the budget; the consequences of its rejection; the degree of flexibility of the executive branch during the budget execution stage; the duration of parliamentary consideration of the budget; the role of specialized committees; access to independent budget information. To calculate the indicators, data from the International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Survey, the Inter-Parliamentary Union database, national regulations, and official documents were used. The empirical analysis across fifteen post-Soviet countries revealed significant variability in the level of parliamentary oversight of the budget process, which largely depends on the characteristics of the political regime, the degree of institutionalization of parliaments, the development of informal decision-making practices, and the international context.