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К четвероякому корню органической репрезентации, или Критика Аристотеля Жилем Делёзом. Часть I: Денатурация различия и три корня репрезентации
The aim of the article is to systematically present a critique of the “organic representation” generated by Aristotle's philosophy, as expressed in Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. The Deleuzian analysis, preceded by a description of the peculiarities of the thinker’s historical-philosophical work, is divided by the author into four “roots” of representation, distinguished by Deleuze himself: the identity of the indeterminate concept, resemblance in the object defined by the concept, opposition in relation to definitions within the concept, and analogy in the relations between ultimate determinable concepts. Regarding each of the first three points, the author shows on which texts of Aristotle the Deleuzian interpretation and criticism is based, and also seeks to show what exactly in Aristotelian theories seemed to Deleuze to be wrong and to have played a fatal role in the transformation of Western philosophy into a philosophy of representation. The leading motive of the criticism in this respect is Aristotle's deprivation of difference of its full nature, or, to use Deleuze’s own terms, its “denaturation”. The author shows the origins and motivations of such denaturation in European philosophy from Deleuze’s point of view, as well as the post-Kantian origins of his considerations. Analyzing Deleuze’s interpretation of the third “root” of representation, the author proves the significance of Porphyry’s Isagoge for understanding how the French philosopher thought of Aristotelian genera, species, specific differences and relations between them. The totality of the first three “roots” makes it possible to understand how Aristotle, in Deleuze's eyes, creates the splicing between identity, opposition and resemblance, which is central to any representational thought and which determines the splicing of ontology, epistemology and logic in Aristotle's philosophy.