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Working paper

К теории равновесного кооперативного поведения в конечных повторяющихся играх

This paper aims at a theoretical justification to the excessive cooperative behaviour well documented in the experiments on public goods games and other settings. Cooperative strategies, while incompatible with Nash equilibrium, admit rationalization as sequentially rational strategies in dynamic games of incomplete information and partially observable actions. This point, made first by Kreps et al. (JET, 1982), remains incomplete inasmuch as beliefs which justify cooperative strategies cannot belong to the standard types space. We complete this argument by constructing an extension of the standard types space, which relaxes assumption of common knowledge of rationality, prove existence of this generalized types space, and discuss its implications for the theory of interactions under incomplete information.