К теории равновесного кооперативного поведения в конечных повторяющихся играх
We investigate a model of one-stage bidding between two differently informed stockmarket agents for a risky asset (share). The random liquidation price of a share may take two values: the integer positive m with probability p and 0 with probability 1−p. Player 1 (insider) is informed about the price, Player 2 is not. Both players know the probability p. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider. Both players propose simultaneously their bids. The player who posts the larger bid buys one share from his opponent for this price. Any integer bids are admissible. The model is reduced to a zero-sum game with lack of information on one side. We construct the solution of this game for any p and m: we find the optimal strategies of both players and describe recurrent mechanism for calculating the game value. The results are illustrated by means of computer simulation.
We study Bertrand competition models with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where uncertainty is given by independent identically distributed random variables. It turns out that Bayesian Nash equilibria of the simplest of these games are described as Cournot prices. Then we discuss general conditions when Cournot prices give Bayesian Nash equilibria for Bertrand games with incomplete information about rivals' costs.
We consider the ranking of decision alternatives in decision analysis problems under uncertainty, under very weak assumptions about the type of utility function and information about the probabilities of the states of nature. Namely, the following two assumptions are required for the suggested method: the utility function is in the class of increasing continuous functions, and the probabilities of the states of nature are rank-ordered. We develop a simple analytical method for the partial ranking of decision alternatives under the stated assumptions. This method does not require solving optimization programs and is free of the rounding errors.
We consider the problem of selecting a predetermined number of objects from a given finite set. It is assumed that the preferences of the decisionmaker on this set are only partially known. Our solution approach is based on the notions of optimal and non-dominated subsets. The properties of such subsets and the objects they contain are investigated. The implementation of the developed approach is discussed and illustrated by various examples.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The results of cross-cultural research of implicit theories of innovativeness among students and teachers, representatives of three ethnocultural groups: Russians, the people of the North Caucasus (Chechens and Ingushs) and Tuvinians (N=804) are presented. Intergroup differences in implicit theories of innovativeness are revealed: the ‘individual’ theories of innovativeness prevail among Russians and among the students, the ‘social’ theories of innovativeness are more expressed among respondents from the North Caucasus, Tuva and among the teachers. Using the structural equations modeling the universal model of values impact on implicit theories of innovativeness and attitudes towards innovations is constructed. Values of the Openness to changes and individual theories of innovativeness promote the positive relation to innovations. Results of research have shown that implicit theories of innovativeness differ in different cultures, and values make different impact on the attitudes towards innovations and innovative experience in different cultures.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.