Реформа российских железных дорог: организация конкуренции и новые проблемы регулирования
The article examines the background and the preconditions of the Russian railway reform. The reform program is analyzed as well as the practical steps towards its implementation. The reform model is compared with those used in other countries. The main achivements of the reform are discussed (industry capitalization, wagon fleet development, attraction of the private entities) and the main problems are pointed out, principally - lack of actual competition in the industry.
This paper studies the organisational structure of contracting out transportation operations to a vertical partnership between local authorities and a vertically integrated monopoly. Pricing decisions are delegated to the partnership operating in the downstream market as a socially concerned firm that maximises a weighted sum of social welfare and profits. The price for essential input required to produce each unit of the transportation service is determined by the monopoly in the upstream market for rolling stock and crew leasing. A forward ownership interest in the vertical partnership held by the monopoly yields a partial rebate of the downstream margin. In turn, the local authorities can extract the upstream monopoly rent via a franchise fee which can be determined ex post. Our theoretical model predicts that local authorities with a relatively high share in the partnership should decrease the net transfer from the budget by increasing the franchise fees if the upstream profit margins are high. The empirical evidence for the impact of the ownership structure on contractual regime is found in the panel data for 25 suburban passenger companies in Russia in 2011-2015, where partial cost recovery and inappropriate compensation plays the role of pseudo-franchising contracts
The paper addresses the existing cross-regional diversity of delivery models in the sector of suburban passenger transportation in Russia by building a formal model of endogenous organisational choice. We develop a conceptual game-theoretic framework that allows for the trusting partnership to have become equilibrium in a regulatory bargaining game with delegation. The monopoly service provider initiates a more cooperative relationship with regional authorities by offering a share in the joint venture. The latter being benevolent welfare maximiser either accepts or rejects the offer taking into account transportation market characteristics, local budget constraints, information structure, as well as socio-economic and political factors. Once the partnership is formed the private information of the parties is revealed and information rent is eliminated creating the room for welfare improvement. However, ex ante rational organisational choice to form a trusting partnership may not lead to welfare improvement ex post. In the extended model we consider how concessionary passengers and fare-dodgers affect the bargaining outcomes. Our results can be generalized to characterize the diversity of organizational choices in the public sector.
Railway reform in Russia aims at opening the room for competition. The paper assesses the impact effect of new tariff structure on internal on-track competition and investigates its’ state at the early stage of reform. It shows that lack of tariff flexibility makes the emerged industry structure unsustainable when vertically integrated state-owned infrastructure company serves the downstream market. This provides strong incentives for the infrastructure owner to establish ‘daughter’ (unregulated) train operating companies in order to prevent cream-skimming by competitive fringe. Thus the industry structure gravitates toward complete vertical separation with access to infrastructure charged likewise Ramsey formula and the final services being unregulated.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The results of cross-cultural research of implicit theories of innovativeness among students and teachers, representatives of three ethnocultural groups: Russians, the people of the North Caucasus (Chechens and Ingushs) and Tuvinians (N=804) are presented. Intergroup differences in implicit theories of innovativeness are revealed: the ‘individual’ theories of innovativeness prevail among Russians and among the students, the ‘social’ theories of innovativeness are more expressed among respondents from the North Caucasus, Tuva and among the teachers. Using the structural equations modeling the universal model of values impact on implicit theories of innovativeness and attitudes towards innovations is constructed. Values of the Openness to changes and individual theories of innovativeness promote the positive relation to innovations. Results of research have shown that implicit theories of innovativeness differ in different cultures, and values make different impact on the attitudes towards innovations and innovative experience in different cultures.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.