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Working paper

Эволюция рынка частных сбережений: теоретико-игровой анализ

The paper studies the evolution of markets for private deposits under asymmetric information from game-theoretic perspective. We stady an evolutionary signaling game between large populations of individual investors and banks of two types who may invest in either risky or safe projects, and attract debtholders by sending either high or low signals. Both populations are assumed boundedly rational, and the adaptive evolution of their strategy is explicitly derived from several intuitive assumptions. Our analysis suggests that a systems of competitive banking under asymmetric information and without prudent regulation is inherently prone to banking crises caused by the competitive pressure on the banks to increase their profits by engaging in more risky projects. This situation , in particular, prevents efficient banks from attracting more debtholders and crediting better projects that require higher credit resources. Several conclusions for polisy analysis are suggested, alongside with the properties of the ensuing equilibria.