Институт центрального банка в свете политической экономии австрийской школы
We analyze political economy of Russian Vertical-of-Power in federal-regional aspects. In the year 2008 in Russia new president (the formal head of Russian government) was elected, in the next elections to come in the 2012 most probably that Putin is going to return his formal presidential chair. In this paper we test if governor appointed by new president followed by extra federal money (extra payments from federal budget to regional budget). There are two hypotheses: if new governor appointed by new president leads to significant increase in payments from federal budget to regional budget or there were no changes in payments from federal budget to regional budget. The data analysis confirms the first hypothesis.
Combination of the offered volume on the REPO auction with the Bank of Russia and the demand for it produce powerful signaling mechanism for the interbank money market. In order to have a possibility to emit an unintended signal there is a need for a robust estimator of the demand. This paper proposes an approach to produce such an estimator through an ensemble of logistic and linear regression models. This estimator successfully emulates many of the key features of the process.
This paper analyzes a stylized model of an export-oriented economy. It investigates the impact of macroeconomic policies on the dynamics of the exchange rate, inflation, output and stabilization fund and consider different forms of strategic interaction between the government and the central bank. It is shown that the effective interaction of fiscal and monetary policies is possible under Stackelberg interaction with the government as leader and under cooperation.