The problem of free will remains one of the primary unsolved problems of John Sealre’s philosophy. In his book ‘Freedom and Neurobilology’ (2007) Searle proposes two alternative hypothesis that would allow one to make sense of the nature of freedom, but ultimately finds both of them unsatisfactory. In this paper we propose a modified version of Searle’s argument, which attempts to reconcile the common sense intuitions with physiological determinism on the basis of Kahneman’s theory of cognitive systems. Specifically, we focus on the collision between the fast and the slow cognitive system as the basis for the experience of freedom.
A semiotic interpretation of «I» is given, and conditions of existence of the I outside the boundaries of subjective reality (the possibility of «noumenal I»). We start by acknowledging the imaginary character of the I: in front of us is but a ghost, some «patterns», «compositions», «drawings», «charts» of some object X named «I» that are experience by me (who?), and some «texts» that describe the inner machinery of the former and its relations to the environment (and, among other things, to other similar ghosts of «You», «We», «They»). Further, we discover that «I», a symbolic formation within the psyche, becomes its own «object» (designatum) by mediating the currents of activity the individual generates as a physical entity. The real I is a form in which an individual exists, defined in the encounter of his/her inherent «subject less» activity with the cultural symbols (prototypes) of the I, «impressed» into the individual by culture. As a result of those encounters emerge the true subject of cognition, which constructs an image of the world (contemplative I, thinking I, receiving I, possessing I), the true subject of activity (goal-setting I, achieving I, influencing I, giving I), and the true experiencing subject (enduring I, coexisting I, transcending I).