Проблема «Я»: философские традиции и современность
The methodological challenge is the question whether and with which qualifications something like the concept „Self“ may be attributed to ancient philosophers. The problem “What is man” was discovered by the Ancient Greek culture quite early. For example, at the epoch of Homer, the word autos means in the self-referent speech the body, soma – something that is different from other bodies (existing things) and constitutes one’s selfhood. Plato was the first philosopher who posed the question on the „same“, the true nature of man irrelative to his material substratum. Thus, we can see in Plato the nascency of the notion that the true nature of man conceived as a priori determined mode of being of the soul has transcendental roots. His soul theory can be consequently seen as the first draft of later theories of self-knowledge and the nature of human Self.
Realism about the Self admits existence of the Self as a self-subsistent and independent entity – as a Cartesian ego. Being a kind of mental realism, realism about the Self relies on some phenomenology of the Self. There are two main strategies of refuting realism about the Self. The first strategy is based on reductive physicalism and scientific realism in the Sellarsian sense. The second strategy which can be called linguistic has as its starting point late L. Wittgenstein’s considerations concerning the grammar of the pronoun «I». In the paper advantages and weaknesses of the linguistic refutation of realism about the Self are investigated.