Ситуации равновесия в играх с отношениями предпочтения
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Formal Concept Analysis, ICFCA 2012, held in Leuven, Belgium in May 2012. The 20 revised full papers presented together with 6 invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 68 submissions. The topics covered in this volume range from recent advances in machine learning and data mining; mining terrorist networks and revealing criminals; concept-based process mining; to scalability issues in FCA and rough sets.
Cooperative game theory instruments application to the corporate finance M&A research issues provide an ability to extend the field considered and conclusions obtained. The paper presents the M&A cooperative games modeling and its empirical implementation to analyze the airline strategic alliance as M&A deal.
This book constitutes the second part of the refereed proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Formal Concept Analysis, ICFCA 2012, held in Leuven, Belgium in May 2012. The topics covered in this volume range from recent advances in machine learning and data mining; mining terrorist networks and revealing criminals; concept-based process mining; to scalability issues in FCA and rough sets.
Reaction–diffusion type replicator systems are investigated for the case of a bimatrix. An approach proposed earlier for formalizing and analyzing distributed replicator systems with one matrix is applied to asymmetric conflicts. A game theory interpretation of the problem is described and the relation between dynamic properties of systems and their game characteristics is determined. The stability of a spatially homogeneous solution for a distributed system is considered and a theorem on maintaining stability is proved. The results are illustrated with two-dimensional examples in the case of distribution.
The article is devoted to the problem of the structure of pragmatic constraints. The fact that gricean maxims are neither pure descriptive rules nor pure prescriptive ones is one of the puzzles of early pragmatic theories. I try to clarify the problem of ontological status of pragmatic constraints by means of game theory and optimality theory.
The authors investigate behavioural assumptions underlying the normal performance of market economy. It is assumed that a model of man adequate for market economy can be deduced from the ideal-typical properties of the latter. The main components of such model are rationality and morality. Main ethical categories relevant for market economy are analyzed: trust, justice, equality, virtues, freedom as well as their treatment in modern economics. Behavioural properties specifi c for modern Russian economy are discussed.