Культурно-историческая специфика формирования швейцарской государственности
Self-reliance was a cornerstone of Ujamaa socialism – the ideology of Tanzania from 1967 till the mid-1980s. In the post-Cold-War period socialist ideology was actually abandoned, together with the really valuable concept of self-reliance. As most African countries, Tanzania is crucially dependent on foreign aid. We argue that aid can play a positive part for Tanzania and countries like it, but only if it promotes their self-development which, in its turn, is possible only if a nation is or strives to become self-reliant. However, in contemporary Tanzania the culture of self-reliance has almost disappeared since national ideology has changed, and many people rely on foreign aid and national government, not on their own hard work. At the same time, the union of foreign donors and corrupt national bureaucracy results in Tanzania in aid without development that, as in the case of aid for mosquito bed nets, cannot promote self-reliance and, hence, socio-economic progress.
The Working Paper examines the peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between formal institutions of governance and the real life.
In this article the author attempts to explain the events occurring in the country taking into account the specificity of the Ukrainian political culture. From the point of view of the author, a key player in the Ukrainian revolution in 2014 was the Ukrainian society itself, and any attempt to comment the situation of modern Ukraine, first of all, should take into account civil conditions of the society itself. Qualitative state of civil society in Ukraine outrun the quality of the ruling elite, which inevitably provokes new confrontations and conflicts.
I consider it necessary to formulate the problems in a way that avoids applying a narrow political science approach, which comes down to calculating the number of parties in a country, counting of votes in elections, and so on. A different formulation of the same set of problems allows a much more serious context for analysis. I think that this analysis should start with the answer to the question of what actually a modern African state is, where human rights are or aren’t respected, the concept of human rights does or does not exist, so on and so forth. Although since the end of the 1980s, when the Cold War came to an end and a wave of democratization started in Africa, from a formal point of view, the vast majority of the countries on the continent have established themselves as multi-party democracies, including legal recognition of human rights in their Western interpretation, in many of these countries democracy is in varying degrees of ephemerality up to now. As before, there are problems with human rights, in particular, with the ability to effectively defend them in court. Nevertheless, Africa’s actual achievements in this regard should not be underestimated: nowadays there are, in fact, fewer and fewer odious regimes, which were so typical for the continent until the end of the 1980s. Today, most of Africa’s regimes can be described as more or less “soft” authoritarian.
The paper proposes a political and legal approach to conceptualizing modern democratic state as law-governed, social and secular. It defines legal, institutional, and socio-political characteristics of law-governed, social, and secular state.
This book is about twenty-year's experience of privatization in different countries including Russia. The book also includes sestematozation of academic views at the problems of state failures and effectiveness of the state owership.
This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned banks’ total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (top-managers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity.
The purpose of this paper is to carefully assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. For the state-owned banks, we distinguish between those that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.