Новые юмианцы и интуитивная очевидность скептицизма
The purpose of this essay is to examine the view that every human being is a natural skeptic when confronted with the issues of objective knowledge or moral value. This view is characteristic by so-called new skeptics in contemporary analytical philosophy, many of whom refer to Hume's naturalism as a source for their account of the nature of human knowledge. In particular, they argue that the intuitive conceivability of a skeptical hypothesis is much stronger and immune to refutation than anti-skeptical arguments based on theoretical speculation about the meanings of the words or the contexts of their application. Moreover, new skeptics insist on the irrelevance of anti-skeptical responses when viewed in the light of human condition in the world. In this essay I argue that anti-skeptics in fact have sound arguments against epistemological skepticism because they point out that the intuitive status of a skeptical hypothesis is not so much natural, but rather dependent on the social context and historical traditions of our culture. At the end of the essay I also argue that some versions of pragmatism in epistemology are not to be confused with relativism.