Репрессии в Красной армии в 1920 – 1930-е годы (на примере корейской этнической общности)
This paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus’ behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasi-democratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.
The current Russian state can be seen as a hybrid regime. This hybrid is not, however one of authoritarian and democratic models, but rather of Soviet nomenklatura system and of the mafia-state as described by Balint Magyar, referring to the case of Viktor Orban's Hungary.