Выборы в законодательные собрания субъектов РФ как процесс формирования партийной системы с доминантной партией (на примере выборов 13 марта 2011 г.)
We analyze political economy of Russian Vertical-of-Power in federal-regional aspects. In the year 2008 in Russia new president (the formal head of Russian government) was elected, in the next elections to come in the 2012 most probably that Putin is going to return his formal presidential chair. In this paper we test if governor appointed by new president followed by extra federal money (extra payments from federal budget to regional budget). There are two hypotheses: if new governor appointed by new president leads to significant increase in payments from federal budget to regional budget or there were no changes in payments from federal budget to regional budget. The data analysis confirms the first hypothesis.
This work looks at a model of spatial election competition with two candidates who can spend effort in order to increase their popularity through advertisement. It is shown that under certain condition the political programs of the candidates will be different. The work derives the comparative statics of equilibrium policy platform and campaign spending with respect the distribution of voter policy preferences and the proportionality of the electoral system. In particular, it is whown that the equilibrium does not exist if the policy preferences are distributed over too narrow an interval.
On the basis of in-depth case studies of four Russian regions, Kirov and Voronezh oblasts and Krasnoyarsk and Perm' krais, the trade-offs among social and economic policy at the regional level in Russia are examined. All four regional governments seek to develop entrepreneurship while preserving social welfare obligations and improving compensation in the public sector. Richer regions have a greater ability to reconcile social commitments with the promotion of business. Regions differ in their development strategies, some placing greater emphasis on indigenous business development and others seeking to attract federal or foreign investment. Governors have considerable discretion in choosing their strategy so long as they meet basic performance demands set by the federal government such as ensuring good results for the United Russia party. In all four regions, governments consult actively with local business associations whereas organized labor is weak. However, the absence of effective institutions to enforce commitments undertaken by government and its social partners undermines regional capacity to use social policy as a basis for long-term economic development.