Regulation of Financial Conduct in Russia
The chapter is devoted to evolution of regulation in Russian financial sector. In the first part, we describe the general evolution of regulation starting from the late 1980s when the country started transition to market economy to current situation. The system of regulation came through two large stages: 1989–2013 was a period of coexistence of several different regulatory bodies, and 2013-nowadays when Bank of Russia started to serve as a mega-regulator and took the responsibility over all financial sector. We examine positive and negative side of this evolution. In the second part, we describe several episodes of self-regulation of ethical behavior in several financial markets (banking, microfinance, and debt collection) and try to explain the factors of their success or failure.
Mathematical and computer simulation of economic processes.
The first part of this book is devoted to the old problem of fundamental motivations that can hardly be approached in another way, other than theoretically. The second part of the book is devoted to new or rather marginal concepts that seem capable to enrich general models of motivational processes. Part three of the book deals with the issues of self-regulation and self-determination; in the last two decades the problems of motivation can be hardly dealt with without touching these issues. The focus of the last part of the book is cultural context and cultural mediation of motivation. This book was planned not as a collection of discoveries to be considered, but rather as a collection of nontrivial views that may turn helpful for making a better sense of the discoveries actually made. (Imprint: Nova)
The problem of conflicts between the financial industry professionals’ business interests and the SROs' regulatory activities is studied in this paper. With the help of the elaborated methods the intensity of the US SROs conflicts of interest is revealed since 1991 till 2010 on the basis of the industry professionals’ individual preferences with regard to financial market efficiency. We determined that the professionals gained the maximal accumulated portfolio value provided systematic deviation of the market from normality (efficiency). The professionals’ goals of utility maximization did not match the SROs’ goals of the due market regulation in accordance with the regulator and international organizations requirements. These methods and results could be used in decision making about the allocation of financial market regulatory powers between regulator and SRO.
Our research was focused on young people’s moral self-determination based on different levels of self-regulation. The author’s theoretical model and methodical approach to self-determination study is presented. Self-determination implies active individual self-development, search of ones own existential position and the choice of decisions in problematic situations. The self-regulation phenomenon appears in planning and programming life goal achievements, taking into account significant external and internal conditions, estimation of results and correcting ones’ own activity for subjective-acceptable result achievements, also it appears in the degrees of development and realization of self-organizing processes. The results have shown that young people with a medium level of self-regulation have a less positive moral position than people with high and low levels of self-regulation. For young men, the higher level of self-regulation corresponds to a more positive moral position in the case of separate conceptions of morality and moral strategies. But such regularity isn’t peculiar to young women.
The article examines the problems of delegation of public powers of authority to self-regulated organizations: public powers of authority which may be delegated, spheres of state administration, where delegation of powers is not allowed, validity of control over realization of delegated powers in all cases of such delegation and responsibility of the state for the acts of private persons who exercise public powers of authority.
Writing the paper on the eve of the G20 summit in Cannes, the author expressed a view that except for French President Sarkozy, no one should be surprised by a disappointing outcome in Cannes. More importantly the author argues that this does not mean that the world economy will not be rebalanced just because the G-20 did not ordain the solution. Unsustainable imbalances will eventually be adjusted by economic forces. Refraining from meaningful and urgent collective action, the G-20 leaders choose to let the world rebalance itself more chaotically, with the inevitable result of making things harder for each other. This is not a collective leadership but a joint abdication of responsibility. To prove its usefulness, the G-20 must do more than help old and emerging economic powers agree to disagree. The paper asserts that if the G20 fails the test, it is only a matter of time when the new creditors will see it as in their individual interests to make common cause either to reform existing institutions or to create new ones free of the dominance of the debtor countries. The author concludes that we can only hope that a new grouping of major creditors arrives as the successor to the G-20 in time to avert a replay of the 1930s. The publication is prepared within the framework of a joint project of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) Project and International Organizations Research Institute of the NRU HSE "Increasing Effectiveness of Russia's Participation in G8, G20 and BRICS in accordance with Russian Priorities and National Interests".