Non-cooperative Differential Game Model of Oil Market with Looking Forward Approach
The paper applies Looking Forward Approach to analyze the world oil market with the framework of a differential game model of quantity competition oligopoly. Namely Looking Forward Approach is used to take into account dynami- cally updating information. Under the information we understand the forecast of the oil demand dynamics. We focus on the period from December 2015 to November 2016 and suppose that during this time interval countries did not cooperate offi- cially on the amounts of oil to be produced. Therefore, their behavior can be mod- eled using the non-cooperative game model. As a solution concept for this conflict- controlled process we use feedback Nash equilibrium. In order to define the pa- rameters of model open source data is used, results of numerical simulations and comparison with the historical data are presented.
We investigate a model of one-stage bidding between two differently informed stockmarket agents for a risky asset (share). The random liquidation price of a share may take two values: the integer positive m with probability p and 0 with probability 1−p. Player 1 (insider) is informed about the price, Player 2 is not. Both players know the probability p. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider. Both players propose simultaneously their bids. The player who posts the larger bid buys one share from his opponent for this price. Any integer bids are admissible. The model is reduced to a zero-sum game with lack of information on one side. We construct the solution of this game for any p and m: we find the optimal strategies of both players and describe recurrent mechanism for calculating the game value. The results are illustrated by means of computer simulation.
Cooperative game theory instruments application to the corporate finance M&A research issues provide an ability to extend the field considered and conclusions obtained. The paper presents the M&A cooperative games modeling and its empirical implementation to analyze the airline strategic alliance as M&A deal.
The article is devoted to the problem of the structure of pragmatic constraints. The fact that gricean maxims are neither pure descriptive rules nor pure prescriptive ones is one of the puzzles of early pragmatic theories. I try to clarify the problem of ontological status of pragmatic constraints by means of game theory and optimality theory.
In this paper, we want to introduce experimental economics to the field of data mining and vice versa. It continues related work on mining deterministic behavior rules of human subjects in data gathered from experiments. Game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work with this data. Equilibria also known as game-theoretic predictions solely succeed with experienced subjects in specific games – conditions, which are rarely given. Contemporary experimental economics offers a number of alternative models apart from game theory. In relevant literature, these models are always biased by philosophical plausibility considerations and are claimed to fit the data. An agnostic data mining approach to the problem is introduced in this paper – the philosophical plausibility considerations follow after the correlations are found. No other biases are regarded apart from determinism. The dataset of the paper “Social Learning in Networks” by Choi et al 2012 is taken for evaluation. As a result, we come up with new findings. As future work, the design of a new infrastructure is discussed.
The authors investigate behavioural assumptions underlying the normal performance of market economy. It is assumed that a model of man adequate for market economy can be deduced from the ideal-typical properties of the latter. The main components of such model are rationality and morality. Main ethical categories relevant for market economy are analyzed: trust, justice, equality, virtues, freedom as well as their treatment in modern economics. Behavioural properties specifi c for modern Russian economy are discussed.
On May 18-19, 2012, at the presidential retreat in Camp David in Maryland, U.S. president Barack Obama hosted the 38th annual G8 summit. The leaders discussed global economic growth, development, and peace and security. After less than 24 hours of face-to-face time among the leaders, they issued communiqué of only five pages. However, Camp David was a significant success. The leaders came together to effectively address the most pressing issues of the day while setting the direction for the summits that were to follow, including the summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Chicago, the G20 in Los Cabos, Mexico, and the Rio+20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. That success was propelled by several causes. The first is the set of strong global shocks were particularly relevant to a number of items on the agenda. This included the newest installment of the euro-crisis, spikes in oil and food prices, and the escalating violence in Syria. The second is the failure of the other major international institutions to address these challenges. The third is the club’s dedication to the promotion of democracy and its significance on issues such as the democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa. The fourth is the high relative capabilities of G8 members, fuelled by the strength of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen and the British pound. The fifth is the domestic political control, capital, continuity, competence and commitment of the leaders in attendance. Camp David saw several G8 leaders returning for their sixth or seventh summit and leaders with a secure majority mandate and control of their legislative houses at home. Finally, the constricted participation at the remote and secluded Camp David Summit, a unique and original advantage of the G8 summit style, allowed for more spontaneous conversation and interpersonal bonds. Together, these interconnected causes brought the G8 back, as a broader, bigger, bolder centre of effective global governance.
The collection contains papers accepted for the Fourth International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 28–30, 2010, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The volume may be recommended for researches and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.