Демографические изменения и система родственной поддержки
This article discusses the implications of demographic changes for the system of private intergenerational transfers. We consider the basic demographic factors of private intergenerational transfers, including changes of the population age structure, the abundance of divorces and remarriages, the high level of migration activity, the process of nuclearization - and analyze its influence on the system of private intergenerational transfers.
The paper examines the role of migration in Russia in achieving the government's strategic goals of population growth and ensuring natural growth by 2024. For the migration forecasting, cohort-component method and the algorithms of replacement migration are used. As a result, annual migration growth of 300-304 thousand people is required to maintain the current population size within next five years. Annual migration growth of 6.0-8.9 million people is needed to ensure natural growth. The last means that the goal will not be fulfilled.
In the middle of last century, life expectancy at birth in Russia was similar to that of other European countries. However, from 1964, it slowly declined, with male life expectancy falling by 7·5 years to the nadir of 57·4 years in 1994 after the collapse of the Soviet Union (with an equivalent decrease of 2·3 years in women to 71·1 years). After a slow restoration to the year 2005, life expectancy is increasing at an unprecedented pace of 0·82 years per year, reaching 67·5 years for men and 77·6 years for women in 2017. Pessimists might say that this is just a rebound effect, restoring previous loss rather than indicating continued growth. This question was addressed in a study
in 2014, where the authors cautiously concluded that the increase in Russian life expectancy is a result of the national project to address health care and other state measures. Some of the same authors are now asking whether the current life expectancy in Russia is consistent with the country's wealth.
The mortality rates from homicides and suicides, which serve as an indicator of the psychological well-being and the value of life in society, show a steady decline after the 2000s in Russia. However, another block of causes of death, event of undetermined intent shows the same rapid growth and since 2014 already exceeds the cumulative death rate from homicides and suicides. Researchers believe this block of causes is a reservoir of latent homicides and suicides. As a result, actual data on homicides and suicides are underestimated. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that regional practices of coding the causes of death can largely deform the structure of mortality, which is why the ordinary proportional redistribution of event of undetermined intent within the class “External causes of morbidity and mortality” ICD-10 is not enough. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the actual death rates from homicides and suicides using a model region in which the proportion of event of undetermined intent is minimal. Three options for solving this problem are proposed. The suicide rate increased by 30% regardless of the hypothesis. At the same time, the level of homicides and accidents increased most significantly under the third hypothesis, when all cases of events of undetermined intent were redistributed – there was an increase of 30% compared to 15–20% for the first hypothesis. Assessment for regions, depending on the accepted hypothesis of redistribution of events of undetermined intent, showed differences, demonstrating an underestimation of specific causes of death. In some regions, ill-defined causes are used mainly to hide deaths from suicide (for example, Astrakhan, Samara, Sakhalin and Samara regions, as well as Tuva), and in other regions to conceal homicides (Orel and Vologda regions, Bashkortostan).
The issue is devoted to the topical issues of studying religion and religious processes in modern society, as well as approaches to improving the state religious and migration policy. The collection includes a transcript and the materials of scientific research presented in the form of reports on the all-Russian Scientific and Methodological Conference in memory of Yu.Yu. Sinelina "the Main trends of religious change and secularization in Russia of the XXI century", which was held at ISPR RAS on March 30, 2018.
the article is devoted to the issue of provision of regional systems of higher education with public funding per students, how much the current system of distribution of public funding corresponds to demographic trends and the forecast of the number of potential students. The forecast of the population at the age group of 17-21 years showed that starting from 2019, the Russian higher education system will be subject of increased pressure from applicants. This is caused by the expiration of “demographic hole” of the 1990s. The current guarantee of financial support for higher education at the expense of public funds (at least 800 students for every 10,000 people from the age group of 17-30 years old) can be carried out until 2024 without increasing the volume of public funding. However, the implementation of this standard is provided only by reducing the age cohort of 25-30 years. The ratio of the predicted values of the number of potential applicants and the importance of demand for regional higher education systems allowed us to identify the donor regions, the deficit regions and the recipient regions. An analysis of the current distribution of public funded places between regions of Russia made it possible to identify territorial imbalances that negatively affect the ability of school graduates to receive higher education free of charge in their home region.