Network analysis based on a typology of nodes
We study game equilibria in a network, in each node of which an economy is described by a two-period model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. Each node obtains an externality produced by the sum of knowledge in neighbour nodes. Uniqueness of the inner equilibrium is proved. Ways of behaviour of agent (passive, active, or hyperactive) in dependence on received externalities are studied. Classification of networks based on a notion of type of node is provided. It is shown that the inner equilibrium depends not on the network’s size or topology but on its structure in terms of the types of nodes, and in networks with similar types structure agents in nodes of the same type behave similarly. Changes of the equilibrium under changes in the network structure are studied, as well as network formation, in particular, connection of network components, and appearance of new links.
The paper proposes a list of requirements for a game able to describe individually motivated social interactions: be non-cooperative, able to construct multiple coalitions in an equilibrium and incorporate intra and inter coalition externalities. For this purpose the paper presents a family of non-cooperative games for coalition structure construction with an equilibrium existence theorem for a game in the family. Few examples illustrate the approach. One of the results is that efficiency is not equivalent to cooperation as an allocation in one coalition. Further papers will demonstrate other applications of the approach.
Management in Russia is as difficult to define as a profession as it is in other countries, and the question of what education is appropriate for a future manager is also difficult to define. Business schools in russia need to think more carefully about their curriculums and about what they should be preparing their students for.
In this paper we consider games with preference relations. The cooperative aspect of a game is connected with its coalitions. The main optimality concepts for such games are concepts of equilibrium and acceptance. We introduce a notion of coalition homomorphism for cooperative games with preference relations and study a problem concerning connections between equilibrium points (acceptable outcomes) of games which are in a homomorphic relation. The main results of our work are connected with finding of covariant and contravariant homomorphisms.
In this paper we consider games with preference relations. The main optimality concept for such games is concept of equilibrium. We introduce a notion of homomorphism for games with preference relations and study a problem concerning connections between equilibrium points of games which are in a homomorphic relation. The main result is finding covariantly and contravariantly complete families of homomorphisms.
This article analyzes a sequential search model where firms face identical but stochastic production costs, the realizations of which are unknown to consumers. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying a reservation price property and provide a sufficient condition for such an equilibrium to exist. We show that (i) firms set on average higher prices and make larger profits compared to the scenario where consumers observe production costs, (ii) expected prices and consumer welfare can be non-monotonic in the number of firms, and (iii) the impact of production cost uncertainty vanishes as the number of firms becomes very large.
The ninth issue of annual Collection of articles consists of four sections: “Analysis of actual economic processes”, “Modeling of financial and market mechanisms”, “Dynamic models”, “Discussions, Notes and Letters”. As a whole nine articles are presented
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the amount of investment in knowledge when one of the network firms enters another innovation network. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how innovative companies will behave when deciding whether to enter the innovation network of another country or region, what conditions affect it and how the level of future investments in knowledge can be predicted.
Quality Innovation: Knowledge, Theory, and Practices presents a compilation of recent theoretical frameworks, case studies, and empirical research findings in the area of quality innovation. It highlights the theories, strategies, and potential concerns for organizations engaged in change management designed to address stakeholders’ needs. This reference volume serves as a valuable resource for researchers, business professionals, and students in a variety of fields and disciplines.