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Regular version of the site

Book chapter

Games with incomplete information on both sides and with a public signal on the state of the game

P. 68-78.

Supposing that Player 1’s computational power is higher than that of Player 2, we give three examples of different kinds of public signal about the state of a two-person zero-sum game with symmetric incom- plete information on both sides (both players do not know the state of the game) where Player 1 due to his computational power learns the state of the game meanwhile it is impossible for Player 2. That is, the game with incomplete information on both sides becomes a game with incomplete information on the side of Player 2. Thus we demonstrate that information about the state of a game may appear not only due to a private signal but as a result of a public signal and asymmetric computational resources of players.

In book

Vol. 10. St. Petersburg: Graduate School of Management SPbU, 2017.