Consumers’ heterogeneity and prices in a CES -model of monopolistic competition
We extend the Dixit and Stiglitz set-up by introducing consumer heterogeneity into a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition. By getting a closedform solution for a symmetric equilibrium, we show how the market outcome depends on the joint distribution of tastes and labor productivities of consumers. In contrast to the traditional framework, the model predicts that the short-run equilibrium price may vary with the number of firms, demonstrating both anti- and procompetitive behavior, which is in accordance with economic intuition and empirical evidence.
Data Envelopment Analysis is not very well applicable when a sample consists of firms operating under drastically different conditions. We offer a new method of efficiency estimation on heterogeneous samples based on a sequential exclusion of alternatives and standard DEA approach. We show a connection between efficiency scores obtained via standard DEA model and the ones obtained via our algorithm. We also illustrate our model by evaluating 28 Russian universities and compare the results obtained by two techniques.
The paper describes the assessment of data on the innovation development of individual countries and regions, taking into account a large number of different indicators. An overview of international and national approaches to the assessment of innovative development is presented: Global Innovation Index (Cornell University, INSEAD, and the World Intellectual Property Organization); Portfolio Innovation Index (USA). The mathematical apparatus for calculating each of them is given. The generalized groups of indicators included in each index are described. Designations and methods of calculation are given to a uniform form of presentation. A methodology for assessing the heterogeneity of the innovative development of countries/economic regions of innovation systems based on the use of clustering methods is proposed. The methodology of the compilation of three indices is given, taking into account the results of clustering and evaluating the qualitative proximity of the studied territorial entities.
The present study analyzes Perm, Russia residential housing market supply focusing on sellers' heterogeneity. Many indicators of heterogeneity were consi- dered in the previous research, and all of them were proved to have a great impact on housing prices and time on the market. However, the gap exists in evaluating sellers’ pricing strategies in dynamics mostly because of unavailable data. Current study clears out the effect of time on price using data on asking price dynamics. We employ semiparametric sample selection estimation procedure which accounts for the unobserved property characteristics and non-random selection of objects out of the sample. We consider two main types of sellers: real estate agents and property owners, and show that real estate agents appear to be more impatient compared to property owners. Specifically, they set a lower asking price initially and are more likely to revise it over time if the object is not sold.
This paper presents the game-theoretic model of production and conflict (rent-seeking). It attempts to explain the empirically observed non monotonous relationship between, on the one hand, the rent-seeking intensity and, on the other hand, heterogeneity in asset ownership and quality of property rights protection. We show that there exists an “inverted-U” relationship between the aggregate expenditures on rent-seeking and institutional quality: gradual improvement in the quality of property rights may first lead to more intense rent-seeking, which de escalates after institutions develop beyond certain threshold level. Depending on the level of institutional quality, a movement towards more uniform distribution of assets can exercise both negative influence on economic growth and positive – on the intensity of conflict. We use the obtained results to interpret the historical cases of positive correlation between growth and rentseeking (developing countries in Asia in the second half of 20th century), and characterize the more and less favorable (in terms of rent-seeking costs) distributions of assets.