• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site

Book chapter

Анализ равновесий на цепях в сетевой игре с производственными экстерналиями

С. 84-87.
Матвеенко В. Д., Королев А. В., Скоблова Ю. А.

We continue the study (Matveenko, Korolev, 2015) of a Nash equilibrium in network game with production and knowledge externalities. It is proved that in complete network equilibrium exists only when all agents are homogeneous. The necessary conditions for linking a node to the other one that is already steady in the network are analyzed. On the basis of these results we deduce the conditions for equilibrium in prevailing kinds of networks: dyads and triads, according to their parameters.