«Новички» и «старожилы»: что говорят показатели специального стажа
This book focuses on the questions of how territorial differences in productivity levels and unemployment rates arise in the first place and why territorial differences in labor market performance persist over time. Unemployment divergence and unemployment club convergence have been touched on in a large number of works and have recently also been studied using spatial econometric analysis. In this book we aim to develop the debate to include several important new topics, such as: the reasons why structural changes in some sectors cause slumps in some regions but not in others; the extent to which agglomeration factors explain regional imbalances; the degree of convergence / divergence across EU countries and regions; the role of labor mobility in reducing / increasing regional labor market imbalances; the impact of EU and country-level regional policy in stimulating convergence; and the (unsatisfactory) role of active labor market policy in stimulating labor supply in the weakest economic areas.
The transition to market economic systems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union involves fundamental shifts in the sectoral allocation of resources, in particular, dramatic changes in employment structures. Development of services in Russia turns to be more impressive than in many other transitional countries. This paper uses the Baumol-Fuchs model of the service sector expansion to estimate underdevelopment of services in Russia prior the transition and measure the progress in catching-up that has taken place thus far. Based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (1994-2000) empirical analysis demonstrates that sectoral variation in the difference between withdrawal from and entrance to the labor force is the main reason of changing distribution of labor. For job-to-job transitions low quality of current job matches, tenure effects and labor market segmentation are the most important explanation of inter-sectoral labor mobility.
Using two rounds of nationally representative household survey data in this study, we measure the impact on poverty in Nepal of local and international migration for work. We apply an instrumental variables approach to deal with nonrandom selection of migrants and simulate various scenarios for the different levels of migration comparing observed and counterfactual household expenditure distribution. Our results indicate that one-fifth of the poverty reduction in Nepal occurring between 1995 and 2004 can be attributed to higher levels of work-related migration and remittances sent home. We also show that while the increase in international work-related migration was the leading cause of this poverty reduction, domestic migration also played an important role. Our findings demonstrate that strategies for economic growth and poverty reduction in Nepal should consider aspects of the dynamics of domestic and international migration.
The article describes the current state of school teachers extra-role behavior and identification with the school, in the context of Russian education reform. Literature review concerns what kind of behavior of teacher can be «extra-role», what means to be a "good teacher" or «good soldier» in school, what factors can be the cause or boost this behavior. Extra-role behavior is an essential component of labor efficiency, we propose to pay attention to it in the selection, evaluation and certification of teachers.
Among the many factors boosting extra-role behavior, three predictors were chosen: tenure at particularly school, school itself as grouping variable, identification with the school as organization. Hierarchical regression models based on data from school teachers in Vologda, Russia (N = 78, 6 schools), explained extra-role behavior «changing» behavior (Model 2. Improving the functionality, = 0.21) and behavior directed to peers (Model 4. Help to colleagues, = 0.20). Partial of predictors were different: for the tenure is was 0.10, for school grouping variable - 0.06, and to identification with the school team - 0.02.
Extra-role behavior of Vologda teachers is more salient compared to the sample of general organizations. Newcomers (by years in particularly school) show it much less frequently, perhaps, they do not have opportunities to influence the school organization and helpless to colleagues. Low satisfaction of group identification measured with «A Hierarchical (Multicomponent) Model of In-Group Identification» (Leach, 2008), can be caused by a large load or changes.
We assume that the load decreases extra-role behavior, and this leads to reduced work efficiency and provokes various unproductive compensation strategies: psychological burnout, freeze professional development. Newcomers and tenured teachers are varying by degrees by exhibition of such behavior, we assume the delayed effect of changes to beginners. School variation was large enough to consider the impact of context, because where and with whom we work affect our extra-role behavior.
In this paper we study the influence of academic and administrative contracts on the quality of hiring in the case when the choice of an academic position is a strategic one for a professor. Successful functioning of a university requires effective hiring. Since the talent of candidates at academic market is often unobservable for the university executive, the hiring is delegated to those who are better informed. Usually the most informed agents are heads of departments. In some universities such administrative positions are permanent, while in others universities there is a regular rotation. Moreover in higher education both short term academic contracts and tenure contracts are present. Using a game theoretical model we study the emergence of moral hazard in hiring under different contract systems. We show that professors with low level of academic talent do not want to risk their career in case of a short academic term contract. Use of a short term administrative contract in this case negatively affects their stimulus for hiring more talented candidates, hence, the development of university is hindered. It is shown that both tenure contract and long term administrative contact without a right of termination permit to mitigate this problem and result in hiring of more talented candidates. The constructed model provides a possible explanation for rotation of heads of department in some universities and for existence of practically permanent heads of department in other universities