Осознанные сновидения и личностные черты: современное состояние проблемы и перспективы исследования
Can we learn without knowing we are learning? To what extent is our behavior influenced by things we fail to perceive? What is the relationship between conscious and unconscious cognition? Implicit Learning: 50 Years On tackles these key questions, fifty years after the publication of Arthur Reber¿s seminal text. Providing an overview of recent developments in the field, the volume considers questions about the computational foundations of learning, alongside phenomena including conditioning, memory formation and consolidation, associative learning, cognitive development, and language learning.
Featuring contributions from international researchers, the book uniquely integrates ¿Western¿ thinking on implicit learning with insights from a rich Russian research tradition. This approach offers an excellent opportunity to contrast perspectives, to introduce new experimental paradigms, and to contribute to ongoing debates about the very nature of implicit learning.
Implicit Learning: 50 Years On is essential reading for students and researchers of consciousness, specifically those interested in implicit learning.
In this chapter, I argue that the Durkheimian theory of the sacred is a crucial yet not fully recognized resource for cognitive sociology. It contains not only a theory of culture (which is acknowledged in contemporary sociology), but also a vision of culture-cognition relations. Thus, Durkheimian cultural sociology allows us to understand the crucial role the sacred/profane opposition plays in structuring culture, perception and thought. Based on a number of theories, I also show how another opposition – between the pure and impure modes of the sacred, allows us to explain dynamic features of the sacred and eventually provides a basic model of social change. While explicating this vision and resultant opportunities for sociological analysis I also criticize ‘cognition apart from culture’ approaches established within cognitive sociology. I argue, thus, that culture not only participates in cognition but is an intrinsic ingredient of the human mind. Culture is not a chaotic and fragmented set of elements, as some sociologists imply to a greater or lesser degree, but a system; and as such it is an inner environment for human thought and social action. This system, however, is governed not by formal logic, as some critics of the autonomy of culture presuppose, but by concrete configurations of emotionally-charged categories, created and re-created in social interactions.
The paper is dedicated to the reconstruction of Alexander Piatigorsky’s observational philosophy within the context of the confrontation between two versions of the transcendental project of man-in-the-world. The first project accentuates the invariant functional organization of cognitive systems by abstracting from bodily, affective and phenomenological realization of this realization. On the contrary, the second project emphasizes the phenomenological perspective of the experience of givenness, always already dependent on who’s this experience is and how the cognitive system living this experience is organized. The first project can be called functionalist, and the second – phenomenological. Ontological and epistemological positions of these projects are specified in the problem of the observer, its status in the world and cognitive practice. The observational philosophy possesses an intermediate position between these two programs, for, aiming to disclose the invariant structure of observation, proceeds from the factual experience of the embodied subject placed into the situation of self-observation and observation of the other subject. It is shown that Piatigorsky’s philosophy borrows from the functionalist project the commitment to self-objectivation (observation of thinking is always the observation of the other thinking) and rejection from the spatiotemporal localization of cognitive activity (thinking is always ‘none’s’ and does not belong to any kind of individual). With the phenomenological project of enactivism Piatogorsky shares the aspiration to disclose the invariant cognitive structures during the empirical observation of the real enactment of cognitive agency (the organization of cognitive systems is the same while its structural realizations are multiple), abandonment of substantialization of the self (‘none’s’ thinking is considered as the emergent effect of interaction among two or several observers – the autopoietic systems), as well as the refusal from theoretical formulation of the problem of consciousness (observational philosophy develops metatheoretical prolegomena to theory of consciousness, which in turn is considered as lived and essentially practical in phenomenology).
The article is devoted to the problem of interpreting of the several consequences that derive from multi-world concepts of modern physics. The inflation scenario and the associated string landscape model are the objects of analysis. The reviewed multi-world concepts are exposed to presume the existence of a plenitude (possibly infinite) of various fundamental principles (laws of nature) that govern the physics of one or another possible reality.
The author represents specifics of physical theories (the criteria and requirements for them) that claim to describe all possible worlds in the conclusions. In this regard, the issues of the status of “possible” and “impossible” worlds and practicable ways to determine them are discussed.
The main result of the study is the justification (based on the assumption of many fundamentally different worlds scenario possibility) that each type of world must correspond to a certain structure of consciousness defined by its basic physical principles (and probably other mathematics). This possibly means that a unified “theory of everything” that includes all possible mathematical and physical fundamental structures cannot exist since every one of them determines a specific type of consciousness (where it is possible).
The article is devoted to the role and place of neuroethics in national and international projects for the study of the human brain. The work deals exclusively with those projects that have chosen the using of complex systemic multifactor models of the brain and nervous system as the main method of research, the coordinated work of which is provided by the large computing resources of hardware and software systems and is implemented in a series of computer simulations of the neurophysiological, neurobiological and neuropsychological processes of a living organism, including human. Such projects declare the widest range of solutions to the problems associated with the study of the brain: from studies the characteristics of the transmission of electrical signals between the synapses of neurons to research in the field of the emergence, functioning and development of such higher functions of the brain as intelligence and consciousness.
The final part of the article is devoted to the correctness of the neurophilosophical concept of the origin and functioning of consciousness and intelligence on the principles of a neuromorphic nature, namely, the possibility of interpreting the phenomenon of the emergence of consciousness as the highest form of nervous activity and its further development, based on natural science laws embedded in the biological structure of the brain and nervous system. Which means, in the case of understanding and further creation of technologies for reproducing such laws, the real possibility of obtaining artificial intelligence and consciousness without reference to living organisms, in particular to humans. The author questions this view of the nature of consciousness in the course of a thought experiment, which is based on arguments from the subject area of computer simulations, and also assumes the brain as a complex computer system, similar to existing supercomputers, but from the point of view of architecture and software arranged and functioning according to more complex algorithms.