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Context, Compositionally, and Nonsense in Wittgenstein's Tractatus
This chapter aims to show that the Tractatus can be coherently committed, at one and the same time, to a strong version of the context principle (sufficiently strong to entail the austere conception of nonsense) and to a version of the principle of compositionality. It is quite natural to interpret these two semantic principles in a manner that renders them mutually incompatible. Taking his cue from some remarks in the Tractatus, the author tries to develop alternative understandings of the two principles according to which they are compatible with one another and indeed positively interdependent. He hopes to show that (1) there is good reason to attribute to the Tractatus the alternative understandings of each of these principles that he develops in the chapter, and that (2) these alternative ways of understanding the two principles are philosophically superior to those that render them mutually incompatible.