О учете изменения индивидуального ресурса в пространственном моделировании электорального выбора
This paper provides evidence for retrospective voting in the very long-term by exploiting a unique quasi-natural experiment of history. We trace the origins of party identification to a critical juncture in the local history of Sasun, a mountainous region of the Ottoman Empire located in Eastern Turkey. Sasun received vital support from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) both during the Great Massacres against Armenians at the end of the 19th century and during the Armenian Genocide (1915–1917). With the help of the ARF, some of the survivors from Sasun were resettled in various villages in modern-day Armenia. Although the party was not active in Armenia during seven decades of Soviet rule, we find that villages with Sasun ancestry display substantially higher electoral support for the ARF than other villages. Evidence from first names of current residents and our field work suggest that this differential support can, at least in part, be explained by historical gratitude and sympathy for the party. We offer suggestive evidence to explain why this sympathy might have endured over generations.
This article analyzes the structural characteristics of the political behavior of students in the municipal elections in Russia. As an empirical base of research used data from a sociological survey of students in Chelyabinsk, devoted to the election of the Head of the municipality. To study the sociological data, the authors used the methods of frequency analysis, as well as methods for calculating chi-squared statistic for testing the level of significance of differences between groups of voters. The study identified the following set of structural characteristics of the electoral behavior of students at local elections. As a result, authors marked (1) electoral passivity and (2) electoral conformism as the main structural features of the political behavior of students in the municipal elections in modern Russia.
Balanced growth paths are typical research subjects for models of macroeconomic dynamics. Balanced growth paths are model solutions that assume constant policy parameters (such as tax rate) and allow for monotonous and proportional growth of model components. In this paper, we construct and test a model with policy switching based on economic retrospective voting: the model allows to switch parties in office if an electorally important indicator exhibits decline. A change of ruling party brings about a change in policy. If the second party is then voted out of the office, the system experiences endogenous policy switching. Within this framework, we introduce the term "cyclically balanced growth paths", i.e. non-monotonous solutions where the proportionality of components is broken and then restored every political cycle. We conduct the analysis using differential equations theory and numerical experiments