Управление советской танковой промышленностью в 1930-е 1940-е годы.
The paper discusses how was formed the managment institutions of the Soviet tank industry, from the first steps to creating an effective administration. In focus is the problem of interaction between institutions of industrial management with the state authorities and military administration. Examples of biographies of people, responsible for managing tank industry, shows how varied the Soviet administrative elite, and how these people influence the formation of the Soviet "administrative culture".
A theoretical contribution to the economics and statistics of prominent scientists is described: A. Fayol, one of the founders of industrial management, academician, one of the CEMI RAS' founders N.P. Fedorenko, Nobel Prize winner 1993 R.W. Vogel, the greatest economist of the Middle Ages, the scholastician Thomas Aquinas, a prominent peasant scholar and predecessor of Chayanov - A.F. Fortunatov.
The article reflects the results of the social-economical analysis of restructuring the Russian Army from the fall of the Soviet Union and until the present times. The author assumes that large-scale actions carried out by Defence ministers in 1991-2013 did not result in the establishment of the civil control institution and professionalization of the Russian Army, but only reinforced its corruption and ineffectiveness. Objects for the analysis are transformation processes in the Russian army during the post-soviet period. Close attention is paid to personal input of the Defence Ministers who led restructuring processes. The structural-functional approach to the analysis of the military institute serves as a theoretical background for the research. The article concludes that the transformation of the system of military management and the structure of military forces led to dismantling of the grand mobilization and deployment system that the Russian army inherited from the Soviet Union and to the annulment of the voluminous, however, in reality an illusory potential to lead a long-lasting war. Significantly lesser results during the military reform were reached during the gradual transition to professional armed forces system, which core is formed not by conscripts but by contract soldiers. The basis for low effectiveness of the Russian army lies in the incomplete recruitment of military units with contract soldiers and professional sergeants, as well as the overall crisis of the recruiting system.
Military coups happen for various political, economic, and historical reasons. A vast literature investigates the external factors that affect coup vulnerability, including interstate wars, security threats, regional spillovers, and foreign economic linkages. An even more impressive number of studies, going back almost seven decades, focuses on the domestic causes of military coups. These causes of coups can be classified under two broad headings: background causes and triggering causes. Background causes are those structural determinants that generally increase coup vulnerability in a given country and create motives for coup attempts. The most prevalent background causes concern the regime type and characteristics, historical legacies and cultural diversity, and economic conditions. The triggering causes are temporally and spatially more specific conditions that determine the opportunities for coup plotters. Various types of political instability and violence, such as popular protests and civil wars, can become important triggers. Additionally, the characteristics of the military organization and the effectiveness of coup-proofing strategies fall under this category.
An extensive review of the cross-national civil-military relations literature reveals that very few of the proposed determinants survive empirical scrutiny. Three findings stand out as consistently robust predictors of coup activity. First and most notably, there is broad consensus that the “coup trap” is an empirical reality: coups breed coups. This finding is bolstered by the fact that military regimes are especially vulnerable to coup attempts. Second, income and wealth have a strong negative correlation with coup probability. All else equal, poor countries are more coup prone than their richer and more developed counterparts. Last but not the least, political instability and violence increase coup likelihood, although scholars differ on which exact type of instability or popular unrest is the most significant. Many other oft-cited factors such as colonial legacy, culture, ethnic fractionalization, resource wealth, and economic crisis are not consistently robust in global samples. This observation highlights the need for more metastudies to separate the relevant variables from idiosyncratic effects.