К проблеме методологического плюрализма в психологии
In the report the following approach to a problem of “methodological pluralism” in psychology is offered: in the transformation of psychological phenomena, rather than creating a ladder of “explanation levels” (on which it is possible to climb or to descend to such “fundamentals”, but which cause the explanations to go beyond the framework of psychology), instead, have a topological system, where “levels” or types of explanation are mutual “transcriptions”, ways to read their own senses in different languages. This approach is analogy to methodological abduction (cf: Ch. Pears) – to form and select hypotheses of sense connections between different types of explanations in psychology and their subsequent verification. His goal is the organic unity of different explanatory possibilities of psychology. Experimental refutation of any explanatory hypothesis affects the whole, or almost the whole, complex of different scientific-psychological explanations, which cannot remain indifferent to such rebuttal. A new importance is given to questions about the nature of refutations, empirical basis, about the meaning of “increasing of empirical content” (I. Lakatos) or “competition between various explananses” in the psychology.