Витгенштейнианское следование правилу в неопрагматизме Р. Рорти и его критика Х. Патнэмом
The most comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein’s thought yet compiled, this volume of fifty newly commissioned essays by leading interpreters of his philosophy is a keynote addition to the Blackwell series on the world’s great philosophers, covering everything from Wittgenstein’s intellectual development to the latest interpretations of his hugely influential ideas. The lucid, engaging commentary also reviews Wittgenstein’s historical legacy and his continued impact on contemporary philosophical debate.
This volume contains the proceedings of the 38th Wittgenstein Symposium, Kircheberg am Wechsel, Austria, 2015. The contributions focus on the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy for questions concerning realism, relativism, and constructivism.
This paper considers the theory of objects of Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) in the light of discussions between himself and Bertrand Russell at the beginning of XX century. Meinong’s conception has made significant contribution into the problem of nonexistent objects that still remains one of the most debated in contemporary philosophy. Here author aims to show how theory of objects as such came into being and how its main ideas were discussed and criticized in subsequent philosophical thought.
The questions considered in this review of the recently published book "There Is No Such Thing as a Social Science" by Phil Hutchinson, Rupert Read, and Wes Sharrock, pertain to the philosophy of the methodology of social sciences: what research problems can sociology study? is it possible for sociology to study social world as an empirical world, and what consequences will this sociologists' empirical attitude toward their subject have? The review explores how the authors of the book, with the help of Peter Winch's philosophy of the social sciences, criticize the project of sociology as an empirical enterprise. Then their own project of sociology is critically examined.
The collective monograph, «Langage, pensée et esprit» ("Language, mind and spirit") published in French, presents the outcome of an international research project conducted during the years 2012-2015 by an international group of experts in contemporary philosophy of language and Wittgenstein scholars. The co-authors represent the following universities: University of Bergen, Norway; Université Paris-8 Vincennes Saint-Denis, France; National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia; and Université de Tunis. The monograph examines diverse aspects of L. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language that are of considerable importance for today's philosophy of mind and for the epistemology of contemporary social sciences.
The article deals with the clauses or preconditions of language and culture acquisition. Following G. G. Shpet, A. A. Uchtomsky, M. Heidegger, N. A. Bernshtein and V. V. Bibikhin, the author qualifies them as «pre-experiential origin». This «origin» is regarded as direct intelligible intuition, spiritual integral, non-differentiated unity: I understand, I think, I can. Spontaneous character of this origin does not mean its primitiveness. Non-mediated pre-experiential origin develops in its differentiation that comes to life in joint activity, in interflowing communication giving birth to multiple forms of culture-mediated behavior. Development of these forms hampers perception and understanding of the world in its immediacy but also enriches these acts. Interchange and interaction of the immediate and the mediated is regarded as a necessary condition of human development and productive activity. The author questions the idea of division psychological functions into natural and cultural (higher), assumed in cultural-historical psychology.
It turns out, however, that in spite of one basic difference there runs between these two systems a deep and striking parallelism. This parallelism is so close indeed that it makes possible the construction of a vocabulary which would transform characteristic propositions of Wittgenstein's ontology into Aristotelian ones, and conversely. To show in some detail the workings of that transformation will be the subject of this paper.