Book chapter
Конституция и фундаментальные законы в русском политическом дискурсе XVIII века
In book
Arguing about the juridical nature of the decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, taken in particular constitutional review, the author of this article concludes that the acts in question constitute a normative interpretation case law, equal in their legal power to forceverifiable the rules and have in some cases retroactive.
The article concentrates on Chicherin, a Russian philosopher and lawyer, and his views on the correlation between liberty, law and morality. The author comments on Chicherin's ideas in the context of other views existing at the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries. These are the views of such representatives of the Russian socially political, legal and philosophical ideas as Kavelin, Novgorodtsev, Struve, Alekseev and others, including modern researchers. Special reference is maid to Chicherin and Solovyov's polemics, which is important step in the history of Russian philosophy. Pointing out a constant connection between law and morality, that often complement each other on the basis of common values, Chicherin strongly insisted on differentiating between these notions. He was sure that the only way to a moral ideal was freedom, not an outward compulsion. And our past historical experience is the best confirmation of this idea. The work also focuses on the fact that the peculiarity of Russian law philosophy is its concentration on the questions of morality and law, the attempt of becoming closer to a moral ideal.
The article examines the role of an abstract interpretation of acts of the highest courts in the context of the unity of judicial enforcement, due to the need to implement the constitutional prohibition of discrimination enshrined in the administration of justice. Arguing about the validity of acts of abstract interpretation, the author concludes that their binding may be deemed constitutionally justified only if the current system of legal regulation in the mechanism of denial of constitutional jurisdiction.
In this article is considering the process of a forming and evolution of the concept of yerro in the romance language of the first half of XIII cent. On basis of the bilingual texts of the period (Etimologiae of Isidor of Seville, Fuero Juzgo) and also of the official papers of Fernando III is making an analysis of the principal meanings of described concept in this period. Yerro during the reign of Fernando III was considered as a term more ethical than juridical and was used mainly for designate an error, a sin, a fault, but not a crime.