Book chapter
Стресс-тестирование системно значимых банков России: прогнозы на 2013 год
Сучкова Е. О., Платунов К. В.
Language:
Russian
In book
Edited by: Е. А. Асланян Н. Новгород: Нижегородский филиал НИУ ВШЭ, 2013.
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