Глава 1. Обрабатывающая промышленность в структуре российской экономики в 2004–2010 гг.
There co-exist several problems when measuring the level of competitiveness. The major one is that it represents an integral indicator of the enterprise performance. The indicator has something in common with the notion of the utility function used in economics. The latter one stamps a numerical equivalent of the utility associated by an individual from the consumption (or possession) of certain goods. Nevertheless, it stays an implicit (non-observable) function.
In this paper we consider one approach to solving the problems of organizing an effective and "friendly" service that implements a web-environment analytical functionality of a multi-dimensional storage of macroeconomic indicators of the economy.
The chapter focuses on the alternative measures of the relative competitiveness of Russian manufacturing enterprises and on assessing the changes in the distribution of manufacturing firms by those measures between 2005 and 2009.
The author attempts to compare various models of political systems based not on GDP but on Human Development Index which to a greater extent demonstrates that political system correlate with political culture and traditions of a given country.
On the basis of in-depth case studies of four Russian regions, Kirov and Voronezh oblasts and Krasnoyarsk and Perm' krais, the trade-offs among social and economic policy at the regional level in Russia are examined. All four regional governments seek to develop entrepreneurship while preserving social welfare obligations and improving compensation in the public sector. Richer regions have a greater ability to reconcile social commitments with the promotion of business. Regions differ in their development strategies, some placing greater emphasis on indigenous business development and others seeking to attract federal or foreign investment. Governors have considerable discretion in choosing their strategy so long as they meet basic performance demands set by the federal government such as ensuring good results for the United Russia party. In all four regions, governments consult actively with local business associations whereas organized labor is weak. However, the absence of effective institutions to enforce commitments undertaken by government and its social partners undermines regional capacity to use social policy as a basis for long-term economic development.
It is known that anticorruption measures do not significantly reduce the corruption of state employees in Russia. The goal of this research is to analyse factors that influence the level of bribery in public procurement. The investigation is based on data from two surveys. The first was conducted by the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics. The second is the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. We use binary response, ordered logit models and probit models with sample selection in this paper. Our econometric study demonstrates that incentives to bribe are higher in sectors with strong competition. Holding company members and the companies owned by the state are less involved in bribery than are private firms. The probability of bribery increases if unpredictable government regulation and political instability heavily influence enterprise performance.