Феномен свободы в условиях глобализации
In reference to three competing negative principles of freedom (non-frustration, non-interference, and non-domination), Philip Pettit recently presented an argument in favor of the absolute prioritization of non-domination. I refute the absolute priority claim on both analytical and contextual grounds and prove that none of these principles is superior to the others. The contextual analysis shows that partial priority claims are unsuitable for the respective historical and theoretical contexts. The formal analysis demonstrates that the absolute priority claim is logically deficient. Rehabilitation of the non-frustration principle entails that more attention should be paid to human individuality. Additionally, my findings give rise to new theoretical conditions whereby we must make sense of the plurality of liberty principles. I suggest that we are bound to return to the pre-Berlinian state of affairs.
The article is devoted to the problem of mutual correlation between individual and political freedom in the context of ethical, legal and political legitimation of the state. The method - hermeneutical reconstruction and comparative analysis of the state philosophy by Kant, Hegel and Husserl. As a result of hermeneutic reconstruction of Kant’s state philosophy, there are revealed four constitutional factors: the principle of freedom, republicanism, the principle of membership and legality. Kant makes a distinction between noumenal (moral) and phenomenal (political-legal) freedom, emphasizing that in the sphere of politics and law, nominal freedom cannot become the basis of moral law, since it should not be limited from the outside (heteronomically), but only be relied upon by the individual “from within” (autonomously). For Kant, noumenal freedom is the only right initially given to each person on the basis of his belonging to the human race (natural low). The political community, represented by the state, is authorized only to protect this freedom from external coercion, but has no right to encroach on the restriction of internal (nominal) human freedom. Kant chooses the Republic as preferred form of government, since the law is the final authority. As a result of the comparative analysis of Kant’s and Hegel's state philosophy, the author comes to the conclusion that both thinkers are unanimous in understanding freedom as a basis for state legitimization. At the same time, Hegel “removes” Kant's established distinction between nominal and phenomenal freedom and takes as a basis the collective, universal freedom of the state, which embodies objectivity, truth and morality. The highest ideal and duty of the individual is to renounce autonomy in the name of the state, which is defined as a divine end in itself. Hegel picks up the ethical strategy of Kant's interpretation of the state and complementing it with two others: the understanding of the state as a result of natural teleology (the purpose of nature) and as a result of reasonable teleology (conscious and free choice of human). Hegel prefers monarchy as preferred form of government. Husserl, following Kant, develops and consistently radicalizes ethical and instrumentalist understanding of the state, emphasizing its transitory nature and focusing on the self-realization of a free, phenomenologically reflective individual. However, the freedom of the individual phenomenologist is limited by attachment to the phenomenological and contains rudiments of natural and intelligent teleology in the spirit of Hegel. Although phenomenology, in Husserl's understanding, is neither a “state philosophy” nor a purely personal practice, it acquires the specific nature of the intellectual aristocracy: the phenomenological movement and the community of phenomenologists represent the ideal completion of the political history of European humanity.
Humanitarian thought has not yet encountered such challenges as in our day. If biotechnology outlined the perspectives of “posthuman” personology, separating it from the anthropomorphic nature of a sane person, then digitalization and robotization of almost all spheres of social practice bring to the fore the idea of homodice - justifying the need for human existence. The article presents four blocks of challenges to humanitarian knowledge: (1) advances in medicine, prosthetics, transplantology and genetic engineering, which outlined the separation of a sane subject from traditional anthropomorphism (“posthuman” personology); (2) studies of the neuro-physiology of the brain, which advanced new arguments against free will; (3) costs of ill-considered propaganda of human rights; (4) digitization of virtually all socio-cultural practices - from economics and military affairs to the formation and functioning of power. It is digitalization that permeates all these “fields of problematization”, setting their common conceptual and technological platform. In this regard, the question arises of the humanitarian examination of modern technologies and the projects of education, communication and management implemented with their help. We are talking about the examination of not only the consequences or also the progress, or even the possibility of implementing such projects, but also their very need. An important task is the focus of such expertise, its criteria. Obviously, it cannot be directed only at the preservation of the biological species of homo sapiens and the conditions of its survival. Paradoxical choice arises in a situation where freedom and free will are questioned: which is more important - Homo or sapiens? It is time for a clear distinction between the concepts of humanism and humanitarian, including in the last and posthuman personology. If humanitarianism is the personology of the free spirit, then humanism seems to be a place next to economism and nationalism — as forms of limited humanitarianism. This wide range of problems requires understanding not only their content, also the methodology of the humanities, their perspectives for positioning in modern society.