Манипулирование информацией на рынках
We investigate a model of one-stage bidding between two differently informed stockmarket agents for a risky asset (share). The random liquidation price of a share may take two values: the integer positive m with probability p and 0 with probability 1−p. Player 1 (insider) is informed about the price, Player 2 is not. Both players know the probability p. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider. Both players propose simultaneously their bids. The player who posts the larger bid buys one share from his opponent for this price. Any integer bids are admissible. The model is reduced to a zero-sum game with lack of information on one side. We construct the solution of this game for any p and m: we find the optimal strategies of both players and describe recurrent mechanism for calculating the game value. The results are illustrated by means of computer simulation.
The article considers the impact of illegal use of insider information on the securities market. The author makes the assumption that the possession of inside information violates the institute of сompetition and legal interests of market participants.
The article addresses the major problems of application of Russian laws regulating the insider trading issues. Analysis of the court and enforcement practice of application of the mentioned law shows that in practice it is very hard or almost not feasible to bring the insider to the liability for the insider trading. That can be explained by lack of effective legal mechanism needed both for the investigation of the “insider trading” cases carried out by the competent state authorities and for bringing insiders to respective liability.
Adoption of law about inside - very serious step towards formation of the transparent market, without shadow games and gray transactions. The writing, consideration and acceptance of the given statutory act lasted more than 10 years and here, at last, it is accepted. Author tries to analyze, whether it is necessary to wait from it for real results.