Resources, institutions and technologies. Game modeling of dual relations
A new approach is proposed revealing duality relations between a physical side of economy (resources and technologies) and its institutional side (institutional relationsd between social groups). Production function is modeled not as a primal object but rather as a secondary one defined in a dual way by the institutional side. Differential games of bargaining are proposed to model a behavior of workers and capitalists in process of prices or weights formation. These games result, correspondingly, in a price curve and in a weight curve - structures dual to a production function. Ultimately, under constant bargaining powers of the participants, the Cobb-Douglas production function is generated.
Mathematical models of nonlinear systems of a certain class allow them represented as linear systems with nonlinear state feedback. In other words, let make the appropriate coordinate transformation of the original dynamic model. Such a transformation, using Lyapunov functions, a number of studies used to determine the parameters of regulators to ensure the asymptotic stability properties of the nonlinear system, ie guaranteeing bounded trajectories emanating from the initial states of the system. For linear systems, there is a powerful and convenient mathematical apparatus allows the synthesis of optimal controls, but this unit is not applicable or partially applicable for nonlinear systems. Unlike prior work in this paper for nonlinear systems linearizable feedback as in the synthesis of optimal control problems with quadratic performance applied the method based on the use of the Riccati equation with parameters depending on the state.
In the present paper the game theory is applied to an important open question in economics: providing microfoundations for often-used types of production function. Simple differential games of bargaining are proposed to model a behavior of workers and capital-owners in processes of formation of a set of admissible factor prices or participants’ weights (moral-ethical assessments). These games result, correspondingly, in a factor price curve and a weight curve – structures dual to production function. Ultimately, under constant bargaining powers of the participants, the Cobb-Douglas production function is received.
The monograph presents the results of calculations of the human capital dynamics and structure for the Russian economy in 1991-2012 years, using the method of accumulated costs by analogy with the calculation of the fixed capital volume. Analysis of the human capital contribution implemented on the basis of the production function model; original mathematical-statistical methods providing stability and economic interpretability of the results developed.
This volume is dedicated to the 80th anniversary of academician V. M. Matrosov. The book contains reviews and original articles, which address the issues of development of the method of vector Lyapunov functions, questions of stability and stabilization control in mechanical systems, stability in differential games, the study of systems with multirate time and other. Articles prepared specially for this edition.
The new economic-mathematical model based on complex variables theory and the new approach to complex variables usage in economics are suggested in the article. The comparison of modeling results of actual production processes using Cobb-Douglass production function and complex variables production function is conducted. It is shown that the instrumental base of economicmathematical methods can be widen with usage of complex variables theory.
Selected works of George Kleiner on economics and mathematics in occasion of his 70th birthday.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.