Динамика количества фирм в рамках концепции экономики разнообразия
Many industries are made of a few big firms, which are able to manipulate the market outcome, and of a host of small businesses, each of which has a negligible impact on the market. We provide a general equilibrium framework that encapsulates both market structures. Due to the higher toughness of competition, the entry of big firms leads them to sell more through a market expansion effect generated by the shrinking of the monopolistically competitive fringe. Furthermore, social welfare increases with the number of big firms because the pro-competitive effect associated with entry dominates the resulting decrease in product diversity.
A contract theory model is studied in which objective functions of a regulator and of two types of firms include ecological variables. It is shown that the choice of a way of functioning of the regulating mechanism (separating or pooling) depends both on political conditions (what kind of regulator defines the mechanism and the contracts) and on economic conditions: a difference between ''dirty'' and ''green'' firms in their efficiency and a degree of their prevalence in the economy. Under a small difference in values of parameter characterizing the types of firms it is shown that if, what seems to be typical for many developing and transition economies, the use of ''dirty'' technologies increases the rentability of the firms and the fraction of ''dirty'' firms in the economy is high then the pooling (non-market, in some sense) mechanism is chosen more often. Under conditions which seem to be typical for industrial countries, where ''green'' firms are relatively efficient, a separating (more market) mechanism can be expected more often.
We propose a model of monopolistic competition with additive preferences and variable marginal costs. Using the concept of "relative love for variety," we provide a full characterization of the free-entry equilibrium. When the relative love for variety increases with individual consumption, the market generates pro-competitive effects. When it decreases, the market mimics anti-competitive behavior. The constant elasticity of substitution is the only case in which all competitive effects are washed out. We also show that our results hold true when the economy involves several sectors, firms are heterogeneous, and preferences are given by the quadratic utility and the translog.
Smoking is a problem, bringing signifi cant social and economic costs to Russiansociety. However, ratifi cation of the World health organization Framework conventionon tobacco control makes it possible to improve Russian legislation accordingto the international standards. So, I describe some measures that should be taken bythe Russian authorities in the nearest future, and I examine their effi ciency. By studyingthe international evidence I analyze the impact of the smoke-free areas, advertisementand sponsorship bans, tax increases, etc. on the prevalence of smoking, cigaretteconsumption and some other indicators. I also investigate the obstacles confrontingthe Russian authorities when they introduce new policy measures and the public attitudetowards these measures. I conclude that there is a number of easy-to-implementanti-smoking activities that need no fi nancial resources but only a political will.
One of the most important indicators of company's success is the increase of its value. The article investigates traditional methods of company's value assessment and the evidence that the application of these methods is incorrect in the new stage of economy. So it is necessary to create a new method of valuation based on the new main sources of company's success that is its intellectual capital.