Концепция прав человека Томаса Погге
. The first generation of human rights is considered to be personal (civil) and political rights and the time of their recognition is associated with the bourgeois revolutions of the XVII century. These rights are also called «negative» in science, because for their implementation it is necessary to fulfill the obligation not to interfere with the realization of rights to others. The second generation of human rights is considered to be socio-economic and cultural rights. The time of recognition of these rights is considered to be the second half of the XIX — the beginning of the XX century and this is due to the large-scale social movements of that time. The second generation of rights is also called «positive», because their implementation requires the implementation of certain steps — «positive actions» on the part of others aimed at the realization of someone’s right. There is a conflict between «negative» and «positive» rights due to the fact that many, including legal scientists and legal philosophers, do not share the position that human rights and freedoms of different generations have equal binding, and often the question of the validity of the rights of the second generation is raised. For example, the discussion about the so-called «contemporary theories of justice» that unfolded in the Anglo-American academic community in the second half of the XX century is widely known, which in many ways is built around the issue of basic rights. Thomas Pogge, a philosopher from the USA, devoted his scientific activity to the consideration of the issue of «global justice» and the solution of issues of world poverty. The conflict between the «first» and «second» generation of rights, according to the scientist, was the reason why global problems are not being solved. Pogge attempted to create an «ecumenical» theory of rights, from which it followed that world poverty was caused by the violation of the «negative» rights of the poorest inhabitants of the planet by influencing them through unfair international institutions supported by residents of developed countries. Pogge’s theory caused a wave of criticism. This article presents the arguments of the opponents, divided into three main groups: 1) criticism of the logic of theory construction through the definition of violated rights as «negative»; 2) criticism from the point of view of the complexity of determining the subject of the offense; 3) criticism from the point of view of difficulties in observing the rights of persons affected by violations. In conclusion, it is concluded that the problems faced by the Pogge concept are also relevant for the general theory of human rights in general.