Cooperative Game-Theoretic Models of the Cournot Oligopoly

International Game Theory Review. 2023. Vol. 25. No. 2. Article 2350004.

Korolev A. V., Ougolnitsky G. A.

In this paper, we build and investigate cooperative games with different characteristic

functions (von Neumann–Morgenstern, Petrosyan–Zaccour, Gromova–Petrosyan) on the

 base of symmetrical Cournot oligopoly game-theoretic models in normal form. We find

Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and cooperative solutions for nonsymmetrical Cournot

oligopoly game-theoretic models in normal form. Also, we build and investigate coop27

erative three-player games with the same characteristic functions on the base of these

models, including the calculation of Shapley value. We compare payoffs received by the

players according to different optimality principles of cooperative games and games in

normal form.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium, cooperative games, characteristic functions, Cournot oligopoly