Метафизика в пределах обычного
The purpose of this essay is to explore the prospects for the use and development of Thompson Clarke’s ideas from his well-known paper, “The Legacy of Skepticism.” The paper is particularly concerned with Clarke’s criticism of the so-called “standard human-conceptual constitution,” which provides a ground for the distinction between plain questions of ordinary life and a philosophical intellectual quest. In support of Clarke’s criticism, it is compared to Donald Davidson’s criticism of scheme-content dualism. Moreover, the paper provides an assessment of G. E. Moore’s arguments against philosophical skepticism, which can be applied to a critical study of metaphysical preconditions in contemporary epistemology and for elaborating on the extended conception of “ordinary.” The main conclusion of the paper is that skepticism, being the logical result of these preconditions, mostly depends on the distinction between pure logical and epistemological possibilities, which is presupposed by the very idea of a conceptual scheme. This distinction is the basis for drawing radical and intuitive skeptical conclusions.