Контрфактический аргумент против дефляционизма в свете двумерной семантики
This article provides an analysis of philosophical background of two-dimensionalism in general and some its particular variants. The paper demonstrates that two-dimensionalism should be treated not as artificial addition to conventional possible worlds semantics but as its natural generalization. It is also shown how ontological and epistemological problems (the correlation between primary and secondary intensions, apriority and necessity, the nature of «mixed» truths etc.) could be converted into pragmatic ones.
The metasemantic version of two-dimensionalism developed by R. Stalnaker is considered in the connection with the opposition "logic as calculus" vs. "logic as uversal medium". Some philosophical and methodological advantages of such approach are pointed out.
There is a chronological study in this paper consisting of three parts: 1) the conception of simplicity of God maintained by St. Thomas Aquinas, 2) rejection of God’s simplicity undertaken by Alvin Plantinga, and 3) an attempt to return to the idea of the simplicity of God in modern analytic research.
The present paper deals with the problem of omnipotence in the context of an original version of possible worlds ontology developed by Alvin Plantinga. His conception of “de re” and “de dicto” is analyzed in connection with the problems of essentialism and transworld identification. Using the notion of TWD (“transworld depravity”) Plantinga claim to solve the logical problem of evil, this solution being the part of his famous FWD (“free will defense”) program. Plantinga’s strategy is to confine the notion of omnipotence step by step with rational arguments. But some of his technical concepts are not clear-cut enough and some of his philosophical speculations are rather scholastic.