Политика принуждения на начальном этапе коллективизации в Прикамье (ноябрь 1929 г. – март 1930 г.)
This article analyzes grass-root politics in the Russian Civil War, challenging the traditional assumption that the Bolsheviks with their program of radical revolutionary change enjoyed greater popularity than their White adversaries. On the example of the Northern region, it demonstrates that the local «counter-revolutionary» government commanded considerable sympathies of the provincial population. This popularity was based on the government's ability to supply the population of this non-agricultural province with imported grain, to provide military protection and arms for self-defense. Ultimately, the article strives to explain the outcome of the Civil War not by conflicting ideologies and policies, but by practical circumstances and local factors that on a grass-root level conditioned changing political loyalties.
This chapter discusses peasant political attitudes during the Russian Revolution and Civil War on the example of their interaction with zemstvos. Focusing on the zemstvo self-government in Arkhangel’sk province in the Russian North between 1917 and early 1920, it tells two interconnected stories: an institutional story of the Northern zemstvo during the Revolution and Civil War and a story of effective peasant collaboration with changing political regimes. I argue that peasants did support different forms of local government if these served the needs of the village and mediated between rural communes and the state. The example of zemstvo self-government in the Russian North highlights the importance of particular local conditions for shaping political and administrative structures of the Civil-War era. An examination of zemstvo activities in the Northern countryside also reveals that during the Civil War when political authority was increasingly fragmented, northern peasants did not seek to break ties with the state. Instead, they tried to engage the state power that was currently controlling their territory.
This paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus’ behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasi-democratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.
SOVIET ECONOMIC MODEL: UNION CENTER AND THE BALTIC REPUBLICS 1953 to March 1965 For the first time ever, this collection of documents offers its readers a whole range of sources on economic history of the Baltic republics. These documents will give the reader a picture of the main trends, problems and achievements of national economies of the Baltic republics, their interaction with the union Center, decision coordination mechanisms, conflicts and controversies accompanying these relationships.
This book examines the history of reforms and major state interventions affecting Russian agriculture: the abolition of serfdom in 1861, the Stolypin reforms, the New Economic Policy (NEP), the collectivization, the Khrushchev reforms, and finally the farm enterprise privatization in the early 1990s. It shows a pattern emerging from a political imperative in imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet regimes, and it describes how these reforms were justified in the name of the national interest during severe crises – rapid inflation, military defeat, mass strikes, rural unrest, and/or political turmoil. It looks at the consequences of adversity in the economic environment for rural behavior after reform and at longrun trends. It has chapters on property rights, rural organization, and technological change. It provides a new database for measuring agricultural productivity from 1861 to 1913 and updates these estimates to the present. This book is a study of the policies aimed at reorganizing rural production and of their effectiveness in transforming institutions.
We address the external effects on public sector efficiency measures acquired using Data Envelopment Analysis. We use the health care system in Russian regions in 2011 to evaluate modern approaches to accounting for external effects. We propose a promising method of correcting DEA efficiency measures. Despite the multiple advantages DEA offers, the usage of this approach carries with it a number of methodological difficulties. Accounting for multiple factors of efficiency calls for more complex methods, among which the most promising are DMU clustering and calculating local production possibility frontiers. Using regression models for estimate correction requires further study due to possible systematic errors during estimation. A mixture of data correction and DMU clustering together with multi-stage DEA seems most promising at the moment. Analyzing several stages of transforming society’s resources into social welfare will allow for picking out the weak points in a state agency’s work.