Autocratic governors in public procurement
The personal role of sub-national rulers is crucial for regional development in countries with weak institutions. This paper studies the impact of regional governors’ tenure in ofﬁce and their local ties on procurement performance in Russia. To identify the causal effect, we construct instruments for governor’s tenure by exploiting the regional vote share of ruling party in past parliament elections. We ﬁnd the evidence that governors who do not have pre-governing local ties in the region (outsiders) demonstrate predatory behaviour, compared to governors with local ties (insiders). Namely, governors-outsiders restrict the competition at awarding stage signiﬁcantly more than governors-insiders. Moreover, for governors-outsiders this restriction becomes stronger with tenure in ofﬁce, while governors-insiders do not demonstrate such negative tenure effect. We argue that this restriction of competition by governors-outsiders cannot be explained by the intention of better contracts execution: the delays in execution and the probability of contract termination either increase or keep stable with tenure for governors-outsiders and these outcomes decrease with tenure for governors-insiders.
In the present paper we have hypothesized an explanation for the fact that the evaluation
of the social impact of law is modeled predominantly by the economic efficiency concept.
Considering the early stages of the concept’s development, we try to make it more
intelligible to the European lawyers.
Despite over 30 years of worldwide reforms in many directions to increase efficiency, public transport markets present a variety of arrangements regarding operations, control and ownership that are amenable to improvement. This workshop will examine the contextual economic, political, cultural and social factors behind these many different cases that can be observed around the world. Through a better understanding of such factors it will examine the competition and ownership options for regulated public transport markets, taking full account of local contextual factors. This will include examination of methods for improving performance without major competition and ownership changes, for example by improved institutional design (both top-down and bottom-up), the development of trusting partnerships, the promotion of negotiated contracts and the introduction of optimal operating rules.
Electron bunching processes in a carcinotrode (backward_wave oscillator with self_modulation of electron emission) operating in the high_efficiency regime determined previously are investigated. The possibility of obtaining an efficiency of about 80% is explained from the physical viewpoint.
This is the first paper on consumer search where the cost of going back to stores already searched is explicitly taken into account. We show that the optimal sequential search rule under costly second visits is very different from the traditional reservation price rule in that it is nonstationary and not independent of previously sampled prices. We explore the implications of costly second visits on market equilibrium in two celebrated search models. In the Wolinsky model some consumers search beyond the first firm and in this class of models costly second visits do make a substantive difference: equilibrium prices under costly second visits can both be higher and lower than their perfect recall analogues. In the oligopoly search model of Stahl where consumers do not search beyond the first firm, there remains a unique symmetric equilibrium that has firms use pricing strategies that are identical to the perfect recall case.
This paper examines determinants of corruption across Russian regions. Key contributions include: (i) a formal study of economic corruption determinants across Russian regions; (ii) comparisons of determinants of perceived corruption versus those of actual corruption; and (iii) studying the influence of market competition and other factors on corruption. The re-sults show that economic prosperity, population, market competition and urbanization are significant determinants of Russian corruption. The use of alternative corruption measures reveals that economic prosperity and population have a largely similar impact on corrup-tion perceptions and corruption incidence. However, there are significant differences in the effects of competition and urbanization.
This study analyzes the effects of reducing trade barriers in the context of the objectives of competition policy. Separate chapters are devoted to the assessment of the height of Russian trade barriers, the analysis of the impact of international trade on domestic prices and concentration of production.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.
The paper studies a problem of optimal insurer’s choice of a risk-sharing policy in a dynamic risk model, so-called Cramer-Lundberg process, over infinite time interval. Additional constraints are imposed on residual risks of insureds: on mean value or with probability one. An optimal control problem of minimizing a functional of the form of variation coefficient is solved. We show that: in the first case the optimum is achieved at stop loss insurance policies, in the second case the optimal insurance is a combination of stop loss and deductible policies. It is proved that the obtained results can be easily applied to problems with other optimization criteria: maximization of long-run utility and minimization of probability of a deviation from mean trajectory.