?
Разрыв между правами собственности и контроля и дивидендная политика российских компаний
The study of dividend policy in the context of corporate governance is of great interest due to the mixed results in both theoretical and empirical analyses. The article tests hypotheses about the impact of dual class stock and the associated gap between ownership and control in the hands of the largest shareholder on the likelihood of dividend payment and its size. The study uses a unique and partially manually collected dataset covering the entire population of the Russian public non-fi nancial companies from 2011 to 2020, the shares of which were listed at the Moscow Exchange. The paper is especially valuable due to the quasi-experimental conditions of the Russian economy, where most companies with dual class stock emerged as a result of government decisions on privatization and reorganization of industries. According to the econometric analysis results the probability of paying dividends is lower in companies with dual class stock as compared to companies with single class shares. Moreover, as the wedge between ownership and control rights of the largest shareholder increases, both the probability of dividend payments and its size decrease. This study may have practical value for the regulator (improvements in the rules governing dual class stock companies) and stock market participants (choice of dividend investment portfolios).